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Abstract
We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces
the Örmís equity risk. The equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where
the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for Örms with more shareholder bar-
gaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the countryís insolvency
procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot
be renegotiated, the equity risk is independent of shareholdersí incentives to default strate-
gically. We argue that these Öndings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic
default can reduce the Örmís equity risk.
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When a Örm is in Önancial distress, its shareholders and debt holders may beneÖt from a debt
renegotiation to avoid an ine¢cient bankruptcy or liquidation. The prospect of a debt reduction
through a renegotiation may, however, induce shareholders to default even if the Örm is solvent
(Hart and Moore (1994)). The view that shareholders may default for strategic, rather than
for solvency reasons, has proved useful to understand, among other things, the theoretical
determinants of corporate bond spreads (Anderson and Sundaresan (1996)), dividend policies
(Fan and Sundaresan (2000)), the optimal debt structure (Berglˆf and von Thadden (1994);
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007)) and the valuation
of debt and equity (Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008), Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), and
Garlappi and Yan (2011)).
This paper asks whether the option of shareholders to default strategically on the Örmís
debt explains di§erences in Örmsí equity risk across countries. This question is motivated
by the observation that shareholdersí expected recovery in default and renegotiation varies
substantially across countries, depending on the characteristics of the bankruptcy code (Djankov
et al. (2008)). Our claim is that the risk of equity should be lower for Örms that operate in
countries where the insolvency procedure favors debt renegotiations. The reason is that the
prospect of a favorable debt renegotiation not only increases the expected payo§ to shareholders
in default, but also induces them to anticipate the timing of default. As a result, the equity risk
becomes less sensitive to the Örmís cash áow risk. We Önd supporting evidence for this claim
in a sample of Örms operating in countries with di§erent debt enforcement procedures. Our
Öndings point to a new important and measurable determinant of the cross-country di§erences
in equity risk. While the existing literature relates the cross-country di§erences in equity risk
to the countryís rule of law, Önancial development and corporate governance, we relate equity
risk to the shareholdersí opportunism induced by the insolvency code.
We carry out our analysis in two steps. First, we use a simple model of strategic default to
derive empirical predictions relating the Örmís equity risk to the shareholdersí payo§ in default
and the procedure of debt enforcement. In the model, the renegotiation of debt is subject
1
to frictions related to the bankruptcy law. If the bankruptcy law prevents renegotiations,
shareholders have little to gain from the strategic default option. If, instead, the bankruptcy law
favors a renegotiation, shareholders have incentives to default strategically in order to extract
rents from debt holders. In this case, a higher shareholdersí expected payo§ in a renegotiation
increases the value of the put option to default and decreases the risk of equity. Therefore, the
model predicts a negative relation between equity risk and the shareholdersí relative advantage
in the renegotiation game. As debt renegotiations are less likely, the option value of strategic
default falls and the equity value covaries more with the Örmís cash áow. In the limit where
debt renegotiations are not feasible, the equity risk becomes independent of the shareholdersí
relative bargaining advantage.
In a second step, we test these predictions in a panel of almost 6,000 Örms operating in
38 countries. The main advantage of conducting an international analysis is that the cross-
country variation in debt enforcement procedures is exogenous to Örmsí decisions. We exploit
this exogenous variation to identify Örmsí strategic default incentives. To measure frictions in
the renegotiation of debt contracts, we use data from the Djankov et al. (2008) survey on the
characteristics of insolvency procedures around the world. We proxy the shareholdersí bargain-
ing advantage relative to debt holders with commonly used Örm-speciÖc variables, namely, asset
intangibility for the Örmís liquidation costs, and the concentration of equity ownership for the
shareholdersí bargaining power in debt reorganizations. Our main measures of equity risk are
the Örmís domestic market beta and total return volatility.1
After controlling for Örm-speciÖc and country-speciÖc characteristics, we Önd that the av-
erage Örmís equity beta and return volatility (1) are lower in countries where the bankruptcy
code favors a renegotiation of debt, (2) decrease with the shareholdersí bargaining advantage
relative to debt holders in a renegotiation, and (3) are less sensitive to the shareholdersí ad-
vantage as the bankruptcy code includes more frictions in the renegotiation process. In terms
of cost of capital, our Öndings imply that Örms operating in environments with more debt
renegotiation frictions pay, on average, between 23 and 30 basis points per month more than
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comparable Örms operating in countries with no debt renegotiation frictions. We also Önd that
the prospect of strategic default reduces the systematic but not the idiosyncratic volatility of
Örms. This Önding rules out the possibility that the systematic risk of Örms reáects insolvency
risk and provides further support to the strategic default hypothesis.
Our results are robust to alternative deÖnitions of beta to account for the fact that many
stocks in our sample may be illiquid or may have time-varying degrees of integration to the
world market. We also show that our results do not depend on other sources of equity risk
that might be simultaneously determined with the strategic default option, including Örmís
Önancial leverage. The results are also robust to the exclusion of multinational Örms, minimizing
the concern that these Örms may strategically Öle for bankruptcy in a more favorable foreign
jurisdiction.
Our paper makes three contributions. The Örst contribution is to clarify the debate on
whether or not strategic default is an important factor for the pricing of Önancial securities.
Although several theoretical papers suggests that the prospect of shareholdersí strategic default
may a§ect the valuation of debt and equity (Francois and Morellec (2004), Davydenko and
Strebulaev (2007), Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008)), it is still unclear if this mechanism is
empirically important. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) Önd that standard proxies of strategic
default behavior do not explain much of the cross-sectional variation of corporate bond prices
in the US. Conversely, Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) conclude that the possibility of strategic
default helps explain the relation between stock returns and default probabilities in the cross-
section of US stocks. These studies measure the shareholdersí expected payo§ in the event
of Önancial distress using only Örm-speciÖc proxies, irrespective of the bankruptcy procedure.
Our Öndings that strategic default a§ects the equity risk of Örms only in countries where
the bankruptcy procedure favors debt renegotiations, suggests that the e§ects associated with
strategic default cannot be examined independently of the legal context.
The second contribution is to show that cross-country di§erences in equity risk are ex-
plained by the interaction between Örm and country characteristics. The existing literature has
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established a robust link between equity risk and country measures of creditor protection (e.g.,
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2011)). We show, instead, that cross-
country di§erences in equity risk can be explained by the interaction between characteristics
of the bankruptcy code and Örm-speciÖc determinants of the incentives to default strategically.
To our knowledge, this paper is the Örst to show that Örm-speciÖc characteristics can ináuence
the Örmís equity risk if they operate in a legal environment with weak protection of creditorsí
rights.
Finally, our paper contributes to the law and Önance literature. This literature has mainly
focused on how the system of law a§ects aggregate outcomes, such as Önancial development.2
Recently, some attention has been given to the role of creditor protection on Örmsí decisions.
Davydenko and Franks (2008) study how international bankruptcy codes a§ect distressed re-
organizations; Acharya, Sundaram and John (2010) and Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010)
examine how bankruptcy codes a§ect the Örmsí capital structure and risk taking, respectively;
Acharya and Subramanian (2009) investigate how bankruptcy codes a§ect Örmsí innovation
strategies. In establishing a link between debt enforcement procedures, strategic default, and
equity risk, our paper highlights an additional important channel through which the system of
law ináuences corporate decisions, and has implications for Örm-level outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the real options model of
strategic default and derives testable predictions. Section II describes the data and develops
our measures of renegotiation frictions and equity risk. Section III presents the empirical
framework and our main results. Section IV contains robustness checks, and section V tests
the modelís implications on volatility and stock returns. Section VI concludes.
I. Theory and Testable Implications
In this section we present a simple model of strategic default to derive predictions relating
frictions in the renegotiation of debt contracts to the Örmís equity risk. The model extends the
setup of Fan and Sundaresan (2000) to allow for the possibility that debt renegotiations between
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shareholders and debt holders can fail because of frictions introduced by the bankruptcy code.
A. The Model
Managers act in the best interest of shareholders and the investment policy is Öxed. Assets
are traded continuously in arbitrage free markets and the term structure is áat, with risk free
rate r at which investors may borrow and lend. The cash áow from operations, X; is independent
of capital structure choices and evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion, with a
constant growth rate $ > 0 and a constant volatility &X , i.e.,
dXt= $Xtdt+ &XXtdBt;
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion. The cash áow uncertainty is the only source of risk
in this model.
Because of the tax deductibility of interest payments, the Örm has an incentive to issue
debt. Debt payments consist of a perpetual coupon payment, c; whose levels remain constant
until the Örm declares bankruptcy. Shareholders have the option to default on this payment,
and will do so when the cash áow falls below an endogenous default threshold, XB. If debt is
renegotiated following default, debt holders are o§ered the Örmís equity in exchange, and the
value of the Örm is split between shareholders and debt holders according to their bargaining
powers, + and 1! +; respectively.3
To account for renegotiations frictions, we follow Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), and al-
low the debt renegotiation to fail with probability q.4 If renegotiations fail, the Örm is liquidated
at a dissipative cost - 2 [0; 1]: Debt holders, who have absolute priority in liquidation, receive
(1! -) of the value of the Örm at default, while shareholders receive nothing. When q is close
to zero, there are few frictions in the debt renegotiation, and there is scope for shareholders
to extract Örm value from debt holders. In the limit where q equals one, the debt cannot be
renegotiated and claims are settled based on absolute priority rules.5
5
B. Optimal Strategic Default
Shareholders choose XB to maximize the value of equity, taking into account the anticipated
outcome of the renegotiation. Using contingent claims techniques (see the internet Appendix
for the details) the after-tax value of equity, E; and the endogenous default threshold XB; can
be written as
E(X;-; +; q) = (1! 0)
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measures the riskiness of the default option.
In equation (1), the value of equity has two terms. The Örst term is the present value of
cash áow minus outstanding debt. The second term, which depends on the distance from the
current cash áow to the default threshold, captures the value of the shareholdersí option to
default. Because 1 < 0; the option to default increases the value of equity and is worth more
the higher the Örmís leverage, c, and the default threshold, XB.
In equation (2), the default threshold increases with the shareholdersí bargaining power,
+; and liquidation costs, -; but decreases with the probability of renegotiation failure, q: Intu-
itively, the strategic default incentives of shareholders increase with their bargaining power or
with the liquidations costs because both increase the share of the total assets that debt holders
will concede in order to avoid a costly liquidation. Conversely, the strategic default incentives
decrease with more renegotiation frictions because, in that case, shareholders are less likely to
extract any renegotiation rents.6
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C. Model Predictions
Our main focus is to study how changes in debt renegotiation frictions, liquidation costs,
and shareholdersí bargaining power a§ect the risk of equity. To price the Örmís equity and
measure its risk, we follow Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004, 2006) and assume the
existence of a risky asset M; which can hedge cash áow uncertainty. We also assume that the
returns on M are perfectly correlated with changes in the Örmís cash áow. As a consequence,
it is possible to replicate the dynamics of the Örmís equity value by holding a portfolio with
time-varying weights in M satisfying dE
E
= wt
dM
M
. A natural way to interpret M is to think of
it as an asset that represents the market portfolio. In such a case, shocks to Örmís cash áow
perfectly correlate with the undiversiÖable market risk.
C.1. Equity Beta
Under these assumptions, the Örmís equity beta equals wt and, as shown in the internet
Appendix, it corresponds to the elasticity of the equity value with respect to X, i.e.,
6E =
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Therefore, the equity beta depends on q; - and + through XB (see equation (2)).
In equation (3) the Örmís equity beta consists of three terms. The Örst one is the Örmís cash
áow beta which, for simplicity, is normalized to one. The second term captures the e§ect of
Önancial leverage on the equity beta. Clearly, a higher leverage increases the equity beta, ceteris
paribus. The third term measures the equityís option value to default. Since 1 is negative, the
more valuable is the option to default relative to the total equity value, the lower is the equity
beta.
In equation (3), 6E measures the Örmís exposure to all the independent risk factors in X. As
such, the equity beta in (3) is not necessarily the market (CAPM) beta. However, given the
assumption that X correlates perfectly with M , 6E captures the priced market risk in X; and
we can therefore interpret it as the market beta.7
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We are interested in the sensitivity of the equity beta to renegotiation frictions and to the
shareholdersí relative advantage in default. Di§erentiating 6E with respect to q; we get
@6E
@q
> 0;
implying that more frictions in the renegotiation of debt contracts lead to a higher equity
beta. Given two identical Örms (i.e., keeping + and - constant), which operate in countries
with di§erent bankruptcy laws, the Örm facing more renegotiation frictions (higher q) has on
average a higher equity beta. The reason is that more frictions in the renegotiation of debt
increase the Örmís undiversiÖable cash áow risk.
Next, di§erentiating (3) with respect to - and + we obtain
@6E
@-
< 0 and
@6E
@+
< 0:
Given two Örms operating in countries with the same degree of debt enforcement (i.e., keeping q
constant) the equity beta is lower for a Örm with larger liquidation costs and higher bargaining
power (higher - and +). As - and + increase, shareholders are able to extract more rents from
debt holders in a renegotiation. In this case, the equity beta decreases because the option value
of strategic default increases.
Furthermore, using (2) and (3) we obtain
@26E
@-@q
> 0; and
@26E
@+@q
> 0;
implying that the sensitivity of the Örmís equity beta to - or + decreases with q.
These comparative statics are summarized in Figure 1, which plots the equity beta as func-
tion of liquidation costs, -; and the frictions in the procedure of debt enforcement, q:8 As shown,
the equity beta depends negatively on liquidation costs when q is low, and is independent of
liquidation costs as q approaches 1. The intuition is straightforward. When debt contracts can
be easily renegotiated, the relative advantage of shareholders increases with liquidation costs.
The reason is that debt holders would receive only a small fraction of the assets if the Örm is
liquidated and therefore prefer to renegotiate the debt contract. This e§ect reduces the equity
8
beta. On the other hand, liquidation costs do not a§ect the equity beta for values of q close to
one because, in this case, the bankruptcy law ensures that debt holdersí claims are protected.
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
We summarize the comparative statics results in the following hypotheses. Other things
equal:
$ Firms in legal regimes that favor the renegotiation of debt contracts have a lower equity
beta.
$ Firms with higher liquidation costs or with higher shareholdersí bargaining power in case
of debt renegotiations have a lower equity beta.
$ The di§erence in equity beta between Örms facing di§erent liquidation costs or sharehold-
ersí bargaining power is smaller in countries with more frictions in the renegotiation of
debt.
C.2. Equity Returns Volatility
In our model, the total volatility of equity returns is derived in a similar way as the equity
beta. As shown in the internet Appendix, total volatility, &E # V ol
&
dE
E
'
; can can be written
as follows:
&E = &X
@E
@X
X
E
= &X6E : (4)
Since &E is linear in 6E ; the comparative statics of total volatility with respect to +; -; and
q are the same as those derived for 6E.
Despite this equivalence, we Önd it useful to look into total volatility and its decomposition
into idiosyncratic and systematic volatility. In our model, shareholders choose only the timing
of default but do not control cash áow risk. Thus, if the bankruptcy code favors debt rene-
gotiations, shareholders may reduce the Örmís systematic risk by defaulting before insolvency.
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However, if the bankruptcy code prevents debt renegotiations, shareholders may also reduce
the Örmís idiosyncratic risk to avoid bankruptcy.9 Because the model excludes this possibility,
it is important to ascertain empirically which component of equity risk is most correlated with
the shareholdersís strategic default option. We expect the bankruptcy code to a§ect systematic
volatility via the strategic default channel, and idiosyncratic volatility via the risk of insolvency.
We study these relations in section V.
D. Discussion
The modelís predictions are derived under the assumption that leverage, c, is given. A
more general setting would allow c to depend also on +; - and q. On one hand, shareholders
could lever up and default strategically if they expected high renegotiation payo§s. On the
other hand, the Örmís ability to raise more debt would be reduced if creditors expected lower
renegotiation payo§s. Therefore, in order to take equation (3) to the data, it is important
that we control for the variation in leverage that is exogenous to equity risk. We address this
concern in section IV.C by instrumenting Örmsí leverage with the countryís statutory corporate
tax rate. The countryís tax rate is exogenous to the Örmsí Önancing decisions and a§ects their
equity beta only through leverage.
In the model, the linearity between the equity beta and expected returns also implies that
we can relate -; + and q to the cross-section of returns. Although section V.B presents results
for the equity returns, the main focus of our analysis is on the relation between strategic default,
the Örmís equity beta, and volatility. The reason is that, in our model, expected returns are
a§ected only because the equity beta is a§ected. Moreover, there is the concern that -; + and
q may proxy for additional risk factors unrelated to strategic default, which a regression based
on cross-sectional returns may fail to capture. Our approach follows several recent papers that
study the equity beta implications of product market competition (Aguerrevere (2009)), corpo-
rate investment (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004)), seasoned equity o§erings (Carlson,
Fisher, and Giammarino (2006)), mergers and acquisitions (Hackbarth and Morellec (2008)),
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and Önancial distress (Garlappi and Yan (2011)).
II. Data Description
To test the modelís predictions, we construct a data set that combines country and Örm-
speciÖc characteristics. The country-speciÖc data include characteristics of the insolvency pro-
cedures. The Örm-speciÖc data include proxies of shareholdersí relative advantage in renegotia-
tion, and standard controls to capture determinants of equity risk. Table I contains an overview
and deÖnitions of the main variables in our data set. The Appendix contains a more detailed
description on the data selection procedure.
<INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE>
A. Country-level Data
We construct a panel of 5,958 Örms in 38 countries from 1993 to 2006. We include all
countries covered by the Djankov et al. (2008) survey that can be matched to Datastream or
CRSP. Djankov et al. (2008) present attorneys and judges in 88 countries an identical case of
a hotel about to default on its debt, and ask them to describe in detail how the hotelís debt
will be enforced in their countries. Based on these responses, they construct country-speciÖc
measures of the quality of debt enforcement, some of which form the basis of our analysis.
The surveys were conducted in 2005. Given the time-series dimension of our analysis, we
project all variables into the past, assuming that they have remained stable through time.
This assumption is based on the premise that a countryís approach to insolvency is deeply
rooted in economical, political, and societal values, which are very persistent, if not permanent,
features of a countryís environment. In section IV.D, we identify those countries that changed
their bankruptcy code during our sample period, and check that our main Öndings continue
to hold in the subsample of country-years following the last recorded change in the countryís
bankruptcy code.10
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<INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE>
A.1. Renegotiation failure, Priority, and Creditorsí recovery
In the model, a high value of q means that an attempt by the shareholders to renegotiate
their debt is likely to fail, i.e., that debt holders are better protected against shareholdersí
strategic default. We construct three proxies for q using the Djankov et al. (2008) survey. The
Örst two, Renegotiation failure and Priority, summarize creditorsí power to enforce their claims.
The third proxy, Creditorsí recovery, measures creditorsí expected payo§ in default. Table II
presents these data.
The Renegotiation failure index summarizes a number of characteristics of debt enforcement
procedures that protect creditors from shareholdersí strategic default. It includes the rights of
creditors to seize and sell the debt collateral without court approval; to enforce their claims in an
out-of-court procedure; to approve the appointment of an insolvency administrator and dismiss
it; and to vote directly on the reorganization plan of a defaulting Örm. The Renegotiation failure
index includes also information on whether an insolvency procedure cannot be appealed, and
whether the management is automatically dismissed during the resolution of the insolvency
procedure. The precise deÖnition of this index is in Table I. Essentially, Renegotiation failure
is an index of the frictions that shareholders will face if they try to renege the outstanding
debt, whether it is through a formal insolvency procedure or outside of court. The index ranges
from zero to one: the higher the score, the stronger the protection of creditorsí rights. Table
II shows that the average value of Renegotiation failure in our sample is 0.54, with a standard
deviation of 0.25.
Our second proxy, Priority, is narrower than Renegotiation failure because it records only
the order in which creditorsí claims are paid upon default. The Priority index ranges from
one to four and equals four in countries where creditors are ranked Örst in the distribution of
proceeds during the insolvency procedure. In countries where Priority has a value smaller than
four, other claimants, such as tax authorities, employees or even shareholders, have priority
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over creditors in the distribution of proceeds. In our sample, deviations from absolute priority
occur in 14 countries. As expected, Priority varies much less across countries than the index
of Renegotiation failure. Moreover, while more than half of the sampled countries exhibit no
violations of absolute priority, only Öve countries have an index of Renegotiation failure equal
to one.11
The shareholdersí strategic default incentives are not only a§ected by the lawís ability to
enforce debt repayments, but also by their expected payo§ in default. Accordingly, we also
use the creditorsí recovery rate, which is an inverse measure of the shareholdersí beneÖts to
engage in strategic default. The Creditorsí recovery index reÖnes Priority because it depends
not only on the order in which secured creditors are paid, but also on the time it takes for a
creditor to get paid, and on the overall estimated costs of the insolvency procedure. In our
model, the creditorsí recovery rate, conditional on default, is strictly increasing and concave in
q.12 Therefore, we expect the same comparative statics as with respect to Renegotiation failure
and Priority. Table II shows that in our sample the highest Creditorsí recovery rate is in Japan
and Singapore, and the lowest in Brazil; the average in our sample is 58%.
A.2. Country-level Controls
In our estimations we use other country level data to control for countriesí heterogeneity in
legal institutions and Önancial markets development. In particular, we control for the origin of
the countryís legal system to account for unobservable characteristics of the insolvency code.
We also control for the depth of the Önancial market because it may ináuence shareholdersí
growth opportunities and their outside options, and thus their strategic default incentives. We
measure Önancial development with the ratio of private credit to GDP (Private credit to GDP),
and the depth and liquidity of the stock market with the stock market turnover ratio (Stock
market turnover) and the stock market capitalization to GDP (Stock market cap to GDP).
Finally, we measure Local Growth Opportunities with the price to earnings ratios of industry
portfolios, following Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007).
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B. Firm-level Data
We compute a Örmís monthly stock return using share prices from Thomson-Reutersí Datas-
tream and CRSP. We match these monthly returns to the Örmís annual Önancial statements
in Thomson-Reuters Worldscope and COMPUSTAT. We follow Fama and French (1992) and
match the accounting data ending in calendar year t! 1 to the twelve monthly stock returns
from July of year t to June of year t+ 1.
Given that our cross-section of countries includes several emerging markets, it is likely that
many stocks are infrequently traded. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) propose a measure
of trading frequency based on the incidence of observed daily zero returns. Since we use monthly
data, we exclude Örms that have a sequence of at least three consecutive zero monthly stock
returns. We verify that our results hold when using di§erent cuto§s (up to six).13
To reduce the impact of outliers, we trim all variables at the 1% level in each tail and exclude
observations where the stock price is less than USD 1. Our sample also excludes Önancial Örms
because Önancial Örmsí accounting data is largely dependent on statutory capital requirements.
To minimize the risk that Örms may be subject to insolvency procedures in countries where
they cross-list rather than at home, we exclude all Örms where the Örst two characters of the
ISIN code do not match with the country of origin. This exclusion, however, does not rule out
the possibility that a Örmmay Öle for bankruptcy in a foreign jurisdiction with an insolvency law
that best protects it from its creditors. Section IV.D discusses to what extent a multinational
Örm can engage in international forum shopping and conÖrms the robustness of our results to
the exclusion of Örms that operate internationally.
The total number of Örms in our sample is 5,958. Table II shows that the number of Örms
varies substantially across countries. In our sample, the countries with the largest number of
Örms are Japan (1,501) and the US (1,225). In section IV.E we show that our results are not
a§ected by the predominance of these two countries in the sample.
14
B.1. Equity Beta
We use the Domestic Market Beta as our Örst measure of equity risk. Following standard
methodology, we estimate monthly Örm-speciÖc domestic market betas by regressing each Örmís
stock return on the contemporaneous domestic stock market index return using 60 historical
monthly observations. Domestic market betas are the appropriate measure of the modelís
equity beta only when the stock is held in a domestic portfolio and the domestic stock market
is segmented from the world market.
As an alternative, we deÖne the Overall Market Beta as the sum of the betas in the regression
of Örmsí stock returns on the contemporaneous world market return (MSCI World) and the
residual of the orthogonal projection of the domestic market return on the world market return.
This deÖnition of beta also corresponds to the equity beta in our model but allows for the risk
factor itself to be an arbitrary combination of the world factor and an orthogonal domestic
factor. Karolyi and Stulz (2003) derive an upper bound for the asset pricing mistake of the
domestic CAPM, when the world CAPM is the correct model.14 Accordingly, we use the Overall
Market Beta for stocks with an asset pricing mistake larger than 0.5% returns per year, and
the Domestic Market Beta for all others stocks.
As a second alternative we use the World Market Beta by regressing Örmsí stock returns
on the contemporaneous world stock market return (MSCI World) using 60 observations. To
identify the stocks that are integrated to the world market we construct the country-year seg-
mentation measure suggested by Bekaert et al. (2011). SpeciÖcally, we collect annual earnings
yields from Datastream and use the 38 Fama-French industries to construct the segmentation
measure. Next, we use the World Market Beta for all stocks in a given country for the years
where the segmentation index is lower than the countryís median. Otherwise, we use theDomes-
tic Market Beta. The advantage of this approach is that it deÖnes segmentation independently
of an asset pricing model. We explore the robustness of our results to di§erent segmentation
cuto§ values in section IV.B.
Table III summarizes the sample distribution of our Örm-speciÖc variables. We Önd that
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the distributions of domestic and world betas are very similar. We report the country average
Karolyi and Stulz (2003) upper bound mistake in the Appendix (Table A.I). The asset pricing
mistakes tend to be high, on average, only in countries where the world market covaries poorly
with the Örmsí returns (e.g., in China, Russia, Taiwan, and Thailand).
<INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE>
B.2. Returns Volatility
Our Örst measure of volatility, Total volatility, is deÖned as the annualized standard devia-
tion of monthly stock returns over the same rolling Öve-year window as the betas. We follow
Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2011) and decompose total volatility into systematic risk and
idiosyncratic risk using a market model. SpeciÖcally, for each Örm i we estimate
rit = -+ 6it"1r
M
t"1+6itr
M
t +6it+1r
M
t+1+"it; (5)
where rit is the Örmís monthly stock return, rMt is the return on the domestic market index,
and "it is an error term. We deÖne Idiosyncratic volatility as the annualized standard deviation
of "it: Our estimate of Systematic volatility is then the square root of the di§erence between
total return variance and the variance of "it:
B.3. Liquidation Costs and Bargaining Power
We use two Örm-speciÖc proxies of the shareholdersí strategic default incentives: the Örmís
liquidation costs and the shareholdersí bargaining power in renegotiations. We measure liq-
uidation costs, -; with the Örmís intangibility of assets. The Intangibles measure is deÖned
as 1 minus the average of the expected exit values per dollar of the di§erent tangible assets,
i.e., receivables, inventories, net property, plant, and equipment, and cash, weighted by their
proportion of total book assets. We use the same exit values for inventories, net property, plant,
and equipment as Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996). As in Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and
Almeida and Campello (2007) we set the exit value of cash to 1, i.e., we consider cash as 100%
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tangible. Since there is disagreement as to whether cash should be included or excluded from
the deÖnition of tangible assets, we evaluate the robustness of our results with a second variable,
Intangibles (with cash), which sets the exit value of cash to 0. The average Intangibles is 45.9%
and the average Intangibles (with cash) is 59.3%. Both variables have a standard deviation of
11%.
As a measure of shareholdersí bargaining power, +; we use the proportion of shares held by
insiders to total shares outstanding (Insidersí share). This proportion includes shares held by
o¢cers, directors and their immediate families; shares held in trust or by pension plans; and
shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. Shares held by in-
siders play an important role in potential renegotiations of debt contracts because larger insider
ownership could improve shareholder coordination and increase the insidersí incentives to work
in the interest of all shareholders. For instance, Betker (1995) shows that a 10% increase in
CEO share holdings increases equity deviations from the absolute priority in Chapter 11 by as
much as 1.2% of Örm value. Our proxy of shareholdersí bargaining power in renegotiations is
closely related to similar proxies used for the US only, as for example in Davydenko and Stre-
bulaev (2007).15 In our sample, Insidersí share is on average 39.9% and its standard deviation
is 22.8%.
B.4. Firm-level Controls
We also control for additional Örm-speciÖc variables that can a§ect equity risk. Firm Size is
the logarithm of the market value of equity. The Örmís book-to-market ratio (Book-to-market)
is the total book value of assets minus the total value of liabilities, divided by the market value
of equity. As suggested by Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) we control for Size in order
to capture di§erences in Örm maturity, and for Book-to-market in order to capture di§erences
in operational leverage. The average Örm in the international cross-section has assets worth
$5.95 billion (median $5.90 billion).
We also control for Önancial leverage, which we expect to a§ect the Örmís systematic risk
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not only through the traditional leverage channel but also through its relation with the Örmís
investment opportunities, as suggested by Gomes and Schmid (2010). Since leverage may be
endogenously determined with the default threshold and the equity risk, we follow Lemmon,
Roberts, and Zender (2008) in order to identify the exogenous variation in leverage. They show
that, in the cross-section of COMPUSTAT Örms, the leverage variation is stable over time and
largely explained by the initial level of leverage. We apply their analysis to our international
sample of Örms and perform a Örst-stage regression of Örm iís leverage at time t > 0 (Lever-
ageit) on Örm iís initial leverage (Leveragei0), and on country and Örm-speciÖc determinants of
leverage. Therefore, our variable Leverage projection is the orthogonal projection of leverage on
Leveragei0, the countryís statutory corporate tax rate, Renegotiation failure, Intangibles, In-
sidersí share, Size, Book-to-market and yearly dummies.16 The countryís statutory tax rate is
the main instrument in this Örst-stage regression because it is unlikely that the Örmsí Önancing
decisions a§ect the countryís statutory tax rate.17 The results from this regression are reported
in Table A.II in the Appendix.
III. Empirical Analysis
This section and the next one present our empirical method and the results of our tests
concerning the equity beta. Section V focuses on volatility and equity returns.
A. Method
Our hypothesis is that the shareholdersí risk related to strategic default is higher in countries
where debt renegotiations are more likely to fail due to frictions introduced by the insolvency
code. The testable implications, derived from equation (3), are that (i) more renegotiation
frictions increase the individual Örmís equity beta, and (ii) the sensitivity of the equity beta to
liquidation costs and shareholdersí bargaining power is lower in countries where debt renego-
tiations are less likely. To test these predictions we regress the Domestic Market Beta on our
measures of Örmís liquidation costs and shareholdersí bargaining power, and on the country
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speciÖc measures of debt enforcement.
By construction, our monthly panel of Örms is likely to exhibit time-series dependence in
Örm-speciÖc variables. Therefore, we follow Petersen (2009) and use a pooled OLS estimator
with Örm-time-clustered standard errors. For robustness, we redo our analysis using a Fama
and MacBeth (1973) estimator, which has been shown to produce unbiased inference in the
presence of cross-sectional dependence (Petersen (2009)).
All our speciÖcations control for Size and Book-to-market in order to capture cross-sectional
di§erences in the maturity of Örms and the operational leverage of the assets in place, re-
spectively. In order to account for the e§ect of Önancial leverage on the equity beta, we use
Leverage projection. Provided that the instruments for Leverage are exogenous, this projection
is orthogonal to the cross-country determinants of equity risk that jointly determine leverage.
B. Direct E§ects of Renegotiation failure
We measure the direct e§ect of debt enforcement on the equity beta through the coe¢cient
=q in the regression
6it = x
0
it>|{z}
controls
+ =qRenegotiation failureC (6)
+ =1Intangibles it + =2Insidersí shareit + "it;
where 6it is month tís equity beta for Örm i in country C: Column 1 of Table IV shows the esti-
mates of this equation. Column 2 reports the results after replacing Intangibles with Intangibles
(with cash).
<INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE>
Controlling for Size, Book-to-market, and Leverage, we Önd that an increase in the likelihood
that a debt renegotiation fails is associated, on average, with a higher beta. This e§ect is
statistically signiÖcant at the 1% level.
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We Önd that the Insidersí share of equity, used here as a proxy for the shareholdersí bar-
gaining power, has a negative and signiÖcant e§ect on the Örmís beta. While Intangibles also
has the hypothesized negative and signiÖcant e§ect on the equity beta, Intangibles (with cash)
has the opposite sign.
Finally, we note that in our international cross-section, value stocks have a larger equity
beta, on average, than growth stocks (Book-to-market), although the e§ect is only signiÖcant
at the 1% level in column 2. This result is consistent with the prediction by Carlson, Fisher, and
Giammarino (2004) that Book-to-market is a close proxy for operational leverage and therefore
increases the equity beta. Surprisingly, we Önd that Size has a positive, although small, e§ect
on beta. One explanation is that, outside the US, the population of listed Örms is heavily
concentrated on mature ones, and the international cross-section fails to identify the e§ect of
Örmsí maturity.
C. Interactions Between Liquidation Costs, Shareholdersí Bargaining Power and Renegotia-
tion failure
To investigate if the empirical relationship between Renegotiation failure and the equity
beta operates through the strategic default channel, we interact Renegotiation failure with our
proxies of shareholderís bargaining power,
6it = x
0
it>|{z}
controls
+ =qRenegotiation failureC + =2Insidersí shareit (7)
+ =q2Renegotiation failureC % Insidersí shareit + "it;
and liquidation costs
6it = x
0
it>|{z}
controls
+ =qRenegotiation failureC + =1Intangibles it (8)
+ =q1Renegotiation failureC % Intangibles it + "it:
According to the model, the equity beta is decreasing in the bargaining power or liquidation
costs but the sensitivity of beta should decrease monotonically as a debt renegotiation is more
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likely to fail. Therefore we expect =2 < 0 and =q2 > 0; and =1 < 0 and =q1 > 0:
The results in columns 3 through 5 of Table IV support these hypotheses. The Örmís
equity beta is decreasing in the shareholdersí bargaining power (column 3) and this e§ect is
signiÖcant at the 1% level. Moreover, the coe¢cient of the interaction term between Insidersí
share and Renegotiation failure is, as expected, positive and statistically signiÖcant. Similarly,
column 4 shows that the direct e§ect of asset intangibility on the equity beta is negative and
signiÖcant, and that the interaction with Renegotiation failure has a predicted positive and
signiÖcant coe¢cient. Column 5 shows that our previous result for the interaction between
asset intangibility and Renegotiation failure (column 4) is robust to a measure of liquidation
costs that includes cash as an intangible asset.
In summary, the results show that the sensitivity of the equity beta to liquidation costs
or shareholdersí bargaining power decreases with the probability of renegotiation failure, as
predicted by the model.
D. Economic Interpretation
Panel B of Table IV shows the results of further tests regarding the quantitative implica-
tions of strategic default on equity beta. The model implies that, in a country where a debt
renegotiation is impossible (q = 1); the strategic default option is worthless. As a consequence,
the equity beta should be independent of the shareholdersí bargaining power and liquidation
costs. Therefore, we test the null hypotheses that @4E
@2
,,,
q=1
and @4E
@1
,,,
q=1
are zero. From (7) and
(8), the relevant test statistics are =^2 + b=q2 and =^1 + b=q1; respectively. To show whether these
statistics are economically signiÖcant, we multiply them by the sample average market risk
premium. Thus, we report the statistics in monthly excess returns, i.e., cost of capital, rather
than beta units.
In line with the modelís predictions, Column 3 shows that the e§ect of bargaining power, as
measured by the Insidersí share, almost disappears (less than 7 basis points per month) when
debt renegotiations are di¢cult. Column 4 shows, however, that Intangibles has a signiÖcant
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negative e§ect on the equity beta, equivalent to 20 basis points excess returns per month,
as Renegotiation failure approaches one. Interestingly, we estimate a larger e§ect (40 basis
points, column 5) when we use Intangibles (with cash). Our interpretation is that Intangibles
overstates the tangibility of cash (it assumes cash is 100% tangible) whereas Intangibles (with
cash) understates it (it assumes cash is 100% intangible). Therefore, the estimates of =1 may
be capturing a return premium to cash that is unrelated to the strategic default channel, as in
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
We also evaluate the economic signiÖcance of the strategic default e§ect on equity beta
by computing the implied di§erence between the average monthly excess returns in a country
where a debt renegotiation is certain (q = 0) and in a country where it is impossible (q = 1). The
test statistics
E(ri!rjq= 1)!E(ri!rjq = 0) = (=^q + =^q2+)% (r
M!r); and
E(ri!rjq= 1)!E(ri!rjq = 0) = (=^q + =^q1-)% (r
M!r);
computed at the sample means of Insidersí share, Intangibles and Intangibles (with cash) are
shown in Panel B of Table IV. We Önd that, ceteris paribus, stock returns in a country with
the highest debt renegotiation frictions are, on average, higher by 8 and 12 basis points per
month than for similar stocks in countries with no renegotiation frictions. This di§erence is
statistically and economically signiÖcant. We also report an upper bound for this di§erence,
by evaluating the statistics above when - or + equal one: the maximum return di§erence can
reach up to 44 basis points per month.
IV. Robustness
So far, our results establish that a countryís debt renegotiation procedure has important
e§ects on the Örmsí beta. The fact that this e§ect goes through the interaction with our
measure of liquidation costs and shareholdersí bargaining power suggests that shareholdersí
strategic default behavior is at play. However, our results also show that q has a direct e§ect
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on beta even if Örms have no advantage vis-‡-vis creditors in renegotiations. In this section we
account for e§ects on equity risk that are unrelated to strategic default incentives and show
that the interaction e§ects that identify strategic default prevail and are even stronger. We
also evaluate the robustness of our results to alternative measures of beta.
A. Additional Cross-country Variation
Following recent studies of the e§ect of institutions on Örm-level outcomes (Bae and Goyal
(2009), or Qian and Strahan (2008)), we control for the countryís ratio of private credit to GDP
(Private credit to GDP), the stock market turnover ratio (Stock market turnover) and the stock
market capitalization to GDP (Stock market cap to GDP). We also construct the measure Local
Growth Opportunities along the lines of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) to control for
growth opportunities and Örmsí outside options. In addition, we include dummy variables
for the origin of the countryís legal system, to account for unobserved country characteristics
unrelated to the insolvency code.
The estimates, reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table V are consistent with our previous
evidence.
<INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE>
Moreover, for average values of Insidersí share or Intangibles, the e§ect of strategic default on
equity risk strengthens: a change in Renegotiation failure from 0 to 1 has an estimated e§ect on
excess stock returns between 29 and 30 basis points per month. We also Önd that the estimate
of =q is either small relative to =^2 and b=q2 (column 1) or it is zero (column 2). The coe¢cient
=q measures the e§ect of q on equity risk when shareholders have no bargaining power or when
liquidation costs are zero, i.e., an e§ect unrelated to the strategic default option. Therefore,
an estimate of zero not only is in line with the modelís predictions but also suggests that our
control variables capture well any residual correlation between institutional characteristics and
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the equity beta beyond the strategic default channel. We use this speciÖcation for all subsequent
tests.
Given that our measures of renegotiation frictions only vary across countries, it is possible
that other unobservable country-speciÖc variables a§ect the estimates of =q; =1; or =2:18 To
address this issue we re-estimate (7) and (8) with all variables expressed as deviations from
their countryís average in the same month. As shown in the Appendix (Table A.III), the
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in Tables IV and V. These results
suggest that the e§ect of renegotiation frictions on the equity beta is not driven by unobservable
country determinants of equity risk, but by the interaction between Renegotiation failure and
liquidations costs or shareholdersí bargaining power.
B. Domestic and World Betas
In columns 3 and 4 of Table V, the dependent variable is the Overall Market Beta for stocks
where the Karolyi and Stulz (2003) upper bound for asset pricing mistakes is larger than 0.5%
returns per year. For all other stocks, the dependent variable is the Domestic Market Beta.
Qualitatively, the results are as in columns 1 and 2. Quantitatively, the e§ect of Renegotiation
failure on equity risk is slightly stronger: between 37 and 38 basis points per month, on average.
Our results are also robust to using theWorld Market Beta for stocks in years where the country
is less segmented than the median (columns 5 and 6). Finally, in unreported results we verify
the robustness of the estimates to using the Overall Market Beta or theWorld Market Beta for
all stocks.
C. Interactions Between Leverage and Renegotiation failure
C.1. Total Leverage
Our sample includes some Örms with very low leverage. With little debt to default on, it
is unlikely that debt renegotiation frictions will a§ect the equity risk of these Örms. Indeed,
inspection of equation (3) reveals that, for a given cash áow X > XB, the lower the Örmís lever-
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age, c, the later the shareholders will default strategically. As shown in the internet Appendix,
the model implies,
@26E
@c@q
> 0;
suggesting that the sensitivity of the equity beta to renegotiation frictions increases with lever-
age. To test this prediction, we estimate (7) and (8) in two subsamples: High Leverage (HL)
and Low Leverage (LL), which contain, respectively, Örms in the top and bottom three deciles
of the Leverage projection distribution. Table VI shows the estimates of the relevant parameters
(the full set of estimates is available in the internet Appendix).
<INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE>
Panel A of Table VI shows that, in general, the model with interactions Öts better the
subsample of High Leverage Örms. The adjusted R2s are equal or higher for the HL than the
LL Örms. The sensitivity of the equity beta to q is slightly larger in the HL subsample for
intermediate values of Intangibles (column 2) but twice as large for the HL subsample at the
average of Insidersí share (column 1). When Intangibles or Insidersí share are set to 1, i.e.,
when the strategic default incentives are maximized, the estimate of @6E=@q is in both cases
much larger for the relatively more levered Örms (HL). In summary, these results suggest that
the strategic default option is unlikely to a§ect the equity beta for Örms with very low leverage,
validating the interpretation of our earlier results.
C.2. Short-term Debt
Shareholders can alter equity risk not only by choosing when to strategically default, but
also by adjusting leverage. For example, expecting more renegotiations frictions, shareholders
may reduce leverage ex-ante or use short-term debt, which can be easily rolled over, rather
than attempting a debt renegotiation. In the results above, the strategic default option is less
valuable for Örms that use less leverage. In this section we explore the sensitivity of the equity
beta to the Örmís use of short-term debt.
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We conjecture that the di§erences in equity beta across countries is smaller for Örms that
use relatively more short-term debt. Indeed, Örms in countries with more debt renegotiation
frictions may not bear much equity risk if they can roll over short-term debt in bad states.
We conduct the same analysis as for total leverage, but we divide the sample into Örms with
high (HSD) and low (LSD) Short-term debt projection. We deÖne Short-term debt as the total
debt that is due within one and three years, divided by total debt. As with total leverage, we
extract its permanent component from the orthogonal projection of Örm iís Short-term debt in
t > 0 on the Örmís initial short term debt (t = 0), the countryís statutory corporate tax rate,
Renegotiation failure, and other Örm, time and country-speciÖc controls (Table A.II).
We Önd that the equity beta of Örms with relatively more short-term debt is less sensitive
to Renegotiation failure (Table VI, Panel B). That is, as q increases, the beta for Örms that
use more short-term debt does not change signiÖcantly. This evidence suggests that, in order
to reduce equity risk, Örms can use short-term debt as an alternative to strategic default.
D. Issues Regarding the Measurement of Renegotiation failure
D.1. Multinational Firms and Bankruptcy Forum Shopping
One important assumption in our analysis is that the insolvency procedures of national
and international corporations follow the law of the Örmsí home country. This assumption
reáects the common practice in cross-border insolvencies that the jurisdiction of the debtorís
home country is the one that takes the lead in the bankruptcy procedure (see Bu§ord et al.
(2001) and Westbrook et al. (2010)). For example, in the UNCITRAL Model Law and the
European Union Regulation ó the two major sources of law for international cooperation of
transnational insolvency cases ó the home country for the insolvency case is the country where
the multinational businessí ìcenter of main interestsî (COMI) is located. Without proof to
the contrary, the COMI is presumed to be the debtorís registered o¢ce (UNCITRAL (1997),
Article 16(3)).19
Our assumption may not hold for multinational corporations that can move their COMI
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to shop internationally for a more favorable bankruptcy law. Although we are not aware of
any systematic evidence that multinational corporations change their place of incorporation for
insolvency reasons, we argue that the possibility of international forum shopping, if anything,
would bias the results against our Öndings.20 The reason is that our analysis assigns to a Örm
the bankruptcy code of the country where it is incorporated. If this Örm had the option to
open an insolvency case abroad it would choose a country where it is better protected against
creditorsí actions, i.e., a jurisdiction with a lower q: But then, this Örm would appear to have
higher q than its ìtrueî one and thus a relatively lower beta than its peers.
To address any residual concern that our results can be a§ected by the possibility of inter-
national forum shopping, we conduct our tests in a smaller sample of Örms with a distinctive
ìdomesticî character. SpeciÖcally, we exclude multinational Örms that have the proportion
of foreign sales or assets above a 5% threshold. As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table VII
our results hold after this exclusion. We obtain the same results if we exclude Örms with a
proportion of foreign sales or foreign assets above their respective country median.
D.2. Time Variation in the Bankruptcy Code
Our measure of q uses survey data from 2005 imputed to all the years in the sample. We
justify this procedure on the basis that this survey is meant to capture permanent features of the
countryís bankruptcy code. To address the concern that some countries may have introduced
bankruptcy code reforms during our sample period, we estimate the same speciÖcations as
in Table V using the subsample of country-years following the last recorded change in the
bankruptcy code.
<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE>
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) track the major changes in the bankruptcy laws of
129 countries between 1978 to 2004. In our sample, the countries that changed the bankruptcy
code during the sample period are Israel (1995), Russia (1994, 1998 and 2004), Spain (2004),
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Sweden (1995), and Thailand (1993).21 Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A in Table VII show the
results of excluding all stocks in these countries in the years up to the last bankruptcy code
change. The remaining sample is likely to satisfy the condition that the bankruptcy code reáects
the one prevailing in Djankov et al.ís (2008) survey. The exclusion of these observations does
not signiÖcantly a§ect the results.
D.3. Other Measures of Renegotiation Frictions
If the prospect of strategic default a§ects Örmsí equity betas, it is likely that the betas
also depend on the expected shareholdersí recovery rate. All other things constant, stocks in
countries where the shareholders expect a low recovery should have a higher equity beta than
stocks in countries where the shareholders expect a high recovery.
To test these conjectures, we estimate equations (7) and (8), using the Priority index and
the Creditorsí recovery rate instead of the Renegotiation failure index. Panel B of Table VII
reports the results. Overall, the predictions of the model are conÖrmed in columns 1 and 3,
where we interact Insidersí share with Priority and Creditorsí recovery. For liquidation costs,
we see in column 2 that the e§ect of Creditorsí recovery on the equity beta is picked up by its
direct e§ect rather than through its interaction with Intangibles. The fact that the Creditorsí
recovery rate is concave in the probability that the renegotiation fails may imply that there is
not enough variation in the distribution of the recovery rate, allowing only for the identiÖcation
of its overall e§ect and not the interaction e§ect.22
E. Further Robustness Checks
We perform four additional robustness checks. The results are available in the internet
Appendix. First, we use Scholes and Williamsí (1977) betas as the dependent variable, to rule
out the possibility that asynchronous trading may a§ect our monthly return observations. We
Önd that our results are not driven by this possibility.
Second, we ask how Japanese and US stocks, which together represent 46% of the sampled
28
Örms, drive our results. Both Japan and the US have an average Renegotiation failure of 0.54.
The average beta in the US is lower than the overall average (see Table A.I), whereas the
sampled Japanese Örmsí average beta is among the highest. However, our sample also has
many Örms in (i) countries with high average betas and a high q (UK, Australia, Singapore),
(ii) countries with low betas and low q (China, Mexico, Russia) and (iii) countries with both
average betas and q (Canada, Korea, Denmark, Sweden). Therefore, we believe that the model
is identiÖed by all countries in our sample, and not just by the comparison between either Japan
or the US and countries on only one half of the range of q: We have run our regressions in a
sample that either excludes Japanese and US stocks, or includes only a random sample of 1,000
stocks for each country. We Önd that the results are identical to those for the full sample of
Örms.
Third, we re-estimate equations (7) and (8) using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimator,
correcting the standard errors for serial correlation using the Newey-West adjustment (Newey
and West (1987)). We Önd that the Fama-MacBeth estimator produces qualitatively identical
results.
Finally, to address the concern that the Örms in our sample may not be comparable across
countries, we match Örms by Size, Book-to-market, and Leverage projection across countries
using the propensity score approach suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004). This approach
generalizes the matching procedure to the case of a continuous treatment variable. The results
using this approach are identical to our main Öndings.
V. Volatility and Returns
A. Returns Volatility
The results presented so far support a robust relation between the countryís debt renegoti-
ation frictions, the Örmís strategic default incentives, and the equity beta. The equity beta in
our model, however, is not necessarily the CAPM beta. It measures the exposure to any priced
risk in X, which need not only be the market risk. Since the volatility of returns captures
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the same concept of equity risk in the model, we can test the comparative statics of risk with
respect to +; -; and q using total volatility as the dependent variable.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table VIII show the estimates of equations (7) and (8) when the
dependent variable is Total volatility. We use the same speciÖcation as in Table V. The full set
of estimates is available in the internet Appendix. For both speciÖcations, the coe¢cients of
Insiderís share and Intangibles are negative and signiÖcant. The coe¢cient of the interaction
between Renegotiation failure and Insiderís share is also consistent with the theory: positive
and signiÖcant. The interaction between Renegotiation failure and Intangibles also has the
predicted positive sign, although it is not signiÖcantly di§erent from zero.
<INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE>
B. Systematic and Idiosyncratic Volatility
To gain further insight into which component of equity risk is most correlated with strategic
default risk, we decompose total volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. This de-
composition is useful because q may also a§ect total volatility through insolvency risk. Namely,
with more debt renegotiation frictions, the value of the strategic default option is lower, and the
sensitivity of equity to insolvency risk is higher. Shareholders may then engage in risk-reducing
activities to avoid the deadweight costs of bankruptcy, as in, e.g., Acharya, Amihud, and Litov
(2010). Although shareholders in our model do not choose cash áow risk, it is important to
evaluate this possibility empirically. We expect that as q increases, the equity beta increases
because the strategic default option loses value, but the idiosyncratic volatility falls because
shareholders reduce the Örmís idiosyncratic risk.
In line with our modelís prediction, we Önd that the results for Systematic volatility are
similar to those for the equity beta (columns 3 and 4): the sums of coe¢cients =1 + =1q and
=2 + =2q are both close to zero, and the estimates of =q are almost zero. Instead, the results for
Idiosyncratic volatility (columns 5 and 6) are remarkably di§erent. The estimated coe¢cients
of the interaction terms between Renegotiation failure and Insiderís share or Intangibles are
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much smaller than for the Systematic volatility model, and they are not signiÖcantly di§erent
from zero. Interestingly, the direct e§ect of Renegotiation failure is negative and signiÖcant, and
almost identical to the one for the Total volatility model (columns 1 and 2). We also evaluate,
at the sample means of Insiderís share or Intangibles, the volatility of Örms in countries with the
highest or the lowest debt renegotiation frictions, i.e., q = 1 or q = 0; respectively. As expected,
in countries where debt renegotiations are impossible, the Örmís systematic volatility is higher
and the idiosyncratic volatility is lower.
We thus conclude that, empirically, the likelihood that a debt renegotiation fails has two
di§erent e§ects on Total volatility: as creditorsí rights strengthen, the Örmís systematic risk
increases, while the idiosyncratic risk decreases. These Öndings not only provide further support
to the strategic default hypothesis, but also help reconcile the apparent conáicting results in
the literature on the cross-country determinants of Örmsí systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2010) Önd that a better protection of creditor rights reduces
Örmsí idiosyncratic risk. By contrast, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), Jin and Myers (2006) and
Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2011) Önd that stronger creditor rights increase the systematic
risk of Örms but do not a§ect their idiosyncratic risk.
C. Equity Returns
We now test whether the variation in equity betas that is explained by the strategic default
incentives also helps explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. In the model, the
linearity between systematic risk and expected returns suggests the same comparative statics of
expected returns with respect to -; +; and q as for the equity beta. Panel A of Table IX shows
the average monthly returns of portfolios of stocks sorted into quartiles by the countryís index
of Renegotiation failure. We report the portfoliosí raw returns, the market-adjusted returns,
and the SizeñBook-to-Marketñmarket adjusted returns. The market-adjusted returns are the
raw returns minus the contemporaneous return on the domestic market index. We use two
alternative three-by-three Size and Book-to-market sorts: across all countries or within each
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country, as in Rouwenhorst (1999) or Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009).23 Hence, the Sizeñ
Book-to-Marketñmarket adjusted returns are the SizeñBook-to-Market adjusted returns minus
the contemporaneous return on the domestic market index.
<INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE>
Panel A shows the average stock returns for the low quartile (LQ) and high quartile (HQ) of
Renegotiation failure. For all four deÖnitions of returns, the return di§erence between the high
and low quartile is positive and statistically signiÖcant. For instance, the di§erence for raw
returns is 12 basis points per month, while the di§erence for the across-country sorted Sizeñ
Book-to-Marketñmarket adjusted returns is 41.5 basis points. This di§erence is economically
large and consistent with our model and with the results using equity beta.
In Panel B we report the average SizeñBook-to-Marketñmarket adjusted (within and across-
country sorted) stock returns for portfolios of Örms sorted by Renegotiation failure and then
into within-country terciles of Insidersí share or Intangibles. To be consistent with the model
and the previous results, we should observe decreasing average stock returns when we move from
tercile 1 (low bargaining power or liquidation costs) to tercile 3 (high shareholdersí bargaining
power or liquidation costs) in the lowest quartiles of the Renegotiation failure index, but not
in highest quartile of Renegotiation failure.
While the results are not so strong for our bargaining power proxy (Insidersí share), we Önd
consistent results with these predictions using our proxy for liquidation costs (Intangibles).
VI. Conclusion
We argue that the prospect of strategic default on the Örmís debt a§ects the Örmís equity
beta, and that this e§ect weakens in countries where debt contracts cannot be easily renego-
tiated. We Önd evidence supporting these predictions using a recent international survey of
insolvency procedures to measure debt renegotiation frictions. We also Önd that the prospect
of strategic default a§ects the Örmís total volatility. Overall, the evidence in this paper suggests
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that the bankruptcy code is an important determinant of the di§erences in cost of capital across
countries through its e§ects on the Örmsí strategic default incentives.
A natural extension of our analysis is to study cross-country di§erences in the tax treatment
of bankruptcy, in order to identify other important determinants of shareholdersí expected
payo§ in default. The non-linear e§ects of the strategic default option may also have important
implications for the skewness of stock returns, a topic worth studying in future research.
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Appendix. Data
We start with all the countries in the paper by Djankov et al. (2008) that are also covered by
Worldscope. We match 55 countries, including all OECD, some Latin American, Middle Eastern and
Asian countries.
Our main Örm identiÖer is the ISIN (International Security IdentiÖcation Number) code. We
download yearly accounting data and monthly price data for all active and inactive Örms between
1989 and 2006. For many countries, there are no accounting and price data available prior to 1989.
Firm-level data. First, we download from Worldscope a comprehensive list of annual accounting
variables, in USD, for every Örm in each country. From COMPUSTAT, we download annual data for
US Örms. We merge both, dropping missing or duplicate ISIN and year observations. Second, we
download monthly price data, in USD, for every Örm in Datastream. For the US, we download price
data from the monthly CRSP Öles. Third, we download a representative stock market index for each
country. Where possible, we use the Datastream USD Market index. If this index is not available, we
use the respective MSCI country index. If the countryís index is not reported in USD in Datastream,
we convert it using the exchange rate reported by Datastream on the same closing day of the month.
For the US we use the equally weighted CRSP index.We use the MSCI World index in USD as the
world market index.
Institutional data. We match the Örm-level data with several country-speciÖc institutional variables
that comes from Andrei Shleiferís webpage and the World Bank. For every sampled country, we collect
variables related to insolvency proceedings and the recovery rate. These variables are not available for
India, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe.
Other Data Screens. We remove all non-equity listings. For Datastream, we only keep listings
where TYPE is equal to "EQ". For US data, we only keep listings with share codes 10 or 11. This
restriction automatically excludes ADRs. We also exclude Örms with fewer than Öve years of monthly
returns and with fewer than six monthly observations to compute the 12-months momentum return.
Finally, we exclude observations for which the stock price is less than USD 1 in order to ensure that
stocks with very low prices do not drive our results. We end up with a sample of 5,958 Örms from 38
countries.
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Table I: Description of Variables and Sources
This table describes the independent variables used in the analysis. The data come from Thomson-Reuters Datastream database, the
University of Chicagoís Center for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP), Thomson-Reuters Worldscope database, Standard
& Poorsí Compustat database and the database from the paper "Debt Enforcement around the World" by Djankov et al. (2008).
Variable name Use Variable description Source
Intangibiles Liquidation costs 1 - (Cash+0.715 % Receivables+0.547 % Inventories+0.535 %
PPE) / Total assets
Worldscope, Compustat
Intangibles (with cash) Liquidation costs 1 - (0.715 % Receivables+0.547 % Inventories+0.535 % PPE) /
Total assets
Worldscope, Compustat
Insidersí shares Sharehdoldersí bar-
gaining power
Number of shares held by insiders / Total shares Worldscope
Renegotiation failure Renegotiation fric-
tions
Measures the probability that shareholders fail to force a rene-
gotiation of debt with creditors. The index is the average of the
following binary (0 if no, 1 if yes) indicators: 1) secured credi-
tors may seize and sell their collateral without court approval;
2) secured creditors may enforce their security either in or out
of court; 3) the entire businessís assets can be pledged as collat-
eral; 4) an insolvency or liquidation order cannot be appealed
at all; 5) an insolvency case is suspended until the resolution
of the appeal; 6) the Örm may enter liquidation without at-
tempting reorganization; 7) secured creditors may enforce their
security upon commencement of the insolvency proceedings; 8)
a defaulting Örm must cease operations upon commencement
of insolvency proceedings; 9) management does not remain in
control of decisions during insolvency proceedings; 10) secured
creditors have the right to approve the appointment of the in-
solvency administrator; 11) secured creditors may dismiss the
insolvency administrator; 12) secured creditors vote directly on
the reorganization plan.
Djankov et al. (2008)
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Table I: continued
Variable name Use Variable description Source
Priority Renegotiation fric-
tions
Equals 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 to reáect the order in which creditorsí
claims are served. A value of 4 indicates that creditorsí claims
are always served Örst.
Djankov et al. (2008)
Creditorsí recovery Renegotiation fric-
tions
The recovery rate for secured creditors, conditional on default. Djankov et al. (2008)
Leverage Control Total assets minus book equity divided by the market value
of the Örm.
Datastream, Worldscope,
Compustat, CRSP
Leverage projection Control Orthogonal projection of the Örmís Leverage in year t > 0 on
Renegotiation failure, the Örmís initial Leverage (year t = 0),
the countryís statutory corporate tax rate, the Örmís Intan-
gibles, Insidersí share, Size and Book-to-market, and yearly
dummies.
Short-term debt Control Debt with 1 to 3 years maturity, divided by the total debt. Worldscope, Compustat
Short-term debt projec-
tion
Control Constructed as Leverage projection, except using short-term
debt instead of Leverage.
Domestic Market beta Equity risk Beta of the regression of the Örmís monthly returns on the
contemporaneous domestic market index returns, using 60-
month rolling windows.
Datastream, CRSP
World Market beta Equity risk Beta of the regression of the Örmís monthly returns on the
contemporaneous MSCI World index returns, using 60-month
rolling windows.
Datastream, CRSP
Overall Market beta Equity risk Sum of the beta of the regression of the Örmís monthly returns
on the contemporaneous MSCI World index returns and the
residuals of the regression of the domestic market returns on
the MSCI returns, using 60-month rolling windows.
Datastream, CRSP
(Continues)
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Table I: continued
Variable name Use Variable description Source
Scholes-Williams beta Equity risk Scholes and Williams (1977) betas, using 60-month rolling
windows.
Datastream, CRSP
Total return volatility Equity risk Standard deviation of the monthly returns, using 60- month
rolling windows.
Datastream, CRSP
Idiosyncratic return
volatility
Equity risk Standard deviation of the residuals of the regression of the
Örmís monthly returns on the lagged, contemporaneous and
lead local domestic market index, using 60-month rolling win-
dows.
Datastream, CRSP
Systematic return
volatility
Equity risk Square root of Total return volatility2 minus Idiosyncratic re-
turn volatility2.
Datastream, CRSP
Size Control Logarithm of the market value of equity. Worldscope, Compustat
Book-to-market Control Logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (book value of equity
divided by market value of equity).
Datastream, Worldscope,
Compustat, CRSP
Momentum Control Average stock return over the past 12 months, skipping the
most recent month.
Datastream, CRSP
Stock market turnover Control Stock market turnover ratio. World Bank
Private credit to GDP Control Total private sector credit / GDP World Bank
Stock market cap to
GDP
Control Stock market capitalization / GDP World Bank
Local Growth Opportuni-
ties
Control Harvey, Bekaert, and Lundblad (2007) measure of Local
Growth Opportunities.
Datastream, Worldscope
Statutory Tax Rate Control The tax rate for the highest bracket of all taxes on corporate
income.
Djankov et al. (2010)
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Table II: Summary Statistics of Country-SpeciÖc Variables
This table summarizes the number of Örms by country and our proxies of debt renegotiation frictions. Country-level
data come from Djankov et al. (2008) and Andrei Shleiferís website. The sample period is from 1993 to 2006. Sources
and deÖnitions of all variables are given in Table I.
Country Number of Renegotiation Renegotiation Priority Priority Creditorsí Creditorsí recovery
Örms failure failure ranking ranking recovery rate rate ranking
Australia 185 1:00 1 4 1 0:85 10
Austria 34 0:67 3 4 1 0:77 13
Belgium 43 0:62 4 4 1 0:91 6
Brazil 48 0:42 11 2 3 0:08 31
Canada 295 0:67 3 4 1 0:93 4
Chile 36 0:00 16 1 4 0:22 29
China 99 0:00 16 4 1 0:42 23
Denmark 65 0:50 8 4 1 0:74 14
Finland 79 0:69 2 4 1 0:92 5
France 275 0:23 15 3 2 0:47 21
Germany 242 0:45 10 4 1 0:56 19
Greece 64 0:42 11 2 3 0:39 24
Hong Kong 24 1:00 1 4 1 0:86 9
Ireland 22 0:62 4 4 1 0:90 7
Israel 55 0:56 6 4 1 0:51 20
Italy 119 0:23 15 3 2 0:37 25
Japan 1; 501 0:54 7 4 1 0:96 1
Korea 154 0:54 7 4 1 0:88 8
Malaysia 63 0:58 5 2 3 0:34 26
Mexico 13 0:27 13 2 3 0:51 20
Netherlands 68 0:25 14 4 1 0:94 3
New Zealand 34 1:00 1 4 1 0:80 12
Norway 31 0:38 12 4 1 0:92 5
(Continues)
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Table II: continued
Country Number of Renegotiation Renegotiation Priority Priority Creditorsí Creditorsí recovery
Örms failure failure ranking ranking recovery rate rate ranking
Peru 5 0:54 7 2 3 0:31 28
Philippines 3 0:54 7 4 1 0:18 30
Poland 35 0:42 11 2 3 0:47 21
Portugal 24 0:54 7 2 3 0:61 16
Russia 13 0:25 14 3 2 0:33 27
Singapore 47 1:00 1 4 1 0:95 2
South Africa 92 0:45 10 4 1 0:39 24
Spain 67 0:46 9 2 3 0:59 18
Sweden 91 0:67 3 4 1 0:81 11
Switzerland 109 0:54 7 4 1 0:60 17
Taiwan 123 0:54 7 2 3 0:71 15
Thailand 52 0:69 2 3 2 0:45 22
Turkey 76 0:69 2 4 1 0:07 32
UK 447 1:00 1 4 1 0:91 6
USA 1; 225 0:54 7 4 1 0:86 9
Total Örms 5; 958
Mean 0:54 3 0:62
Std. Dev. 0:25 1 0:27
Median 0:54 4 0:61
Minimum 0:00 1 0:07
Maximum 1:00 4 0:96
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Table III: Summary Statistics of Firm-SpeciÖc Variables
This table summarizes our Örm-level data pooled across countries and time. Monthly stock market data come from
Datastream and CRSP, and annual Önancial statement data are fromWorldscope and Compustat. The sample period
goes from 1993 to 2006. Sources and deÖnitions of all variables are given in Table I.
Std. 1st First Third 99th
Variable Mean Dev. percentile quartile Median quartile percentile Observations
Domestic Market Beta 0:772 0:409 !0:097 0:487 0:763 1:042 1:799 376,884
World Market Beta 0:746 0:545 !0:235 0:363 0:670 1:044 2:354 376,884
Overall Market Beta 1:546 0:865 !0:214 0:943 1:478 2:084 3:817 376,884
Scholes-Williams Beta 0:813 0:516 !0:250 0:456 0:780 1:129 2:193 367,289
Total return volatility (ann.) 0:358 0:108 0:157 0:278 0:346 0:425 0:649 376,846
Systematic return volatility (ann.) 0:175 0:085 0:029 0:112 0:164 0:229 0:412 376,846
Idiosyncratic return volatility (ann.) 0:304 0:096 0:132 0:233 0:292 0:364 0:57 376,846
Book-to-market (level) 0:155 0:779 !1:785 !0:335 0:165 0:654 1:990 376,884
Momentum 1:282 3:023 !5:800 !0:570 1:159 2:978 9:801 376,864
Size ($ Billions) 5:949 1:664 2:149 4:794 5:904 7:121 9:454 376,884
Leverage 0:274 0:224 0:000 0:079 0:234 0:432 0:820 375,806
Leverage projection 0:275 0:182 !0:088 0:140 0:260 0:399 0:721 376,884
Short-term debt 0:443 1:078 0:000 0:160 0:391 0:664 1:000 330,022
Short-term debt projection 0:456 1:316 !0:026 0:184 0:403 0:661 1:063 348,226
Intangibles 0:459 0:109 0:208 0:392 0:449 0:514 0:784 376,884
Intangibles (with cash) 0:593 0:103 0:417 0:519 0:576 0:650 0:883 376,884
Insidersí share 0:399 0:228 0:002 0:236 0:391 0:558 0:933 376,884
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Table IV: Equity Beta and Renegotiation Frictions
Panel A of this table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic market
beta on proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles and
Intangibles (with cash)), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure), and Örm-speciÖc
controls. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample consists of monthly
observations from 1993 to 2006. Each Örmís domestic market beta is computed each month from the
regression of the past 60 monthly returns on the domestic marketís contemporaneous return. Standard
errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses. Panel
B reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the estimates in panel A, expressed in terms of
average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0:042!!! 0:033!!! 0:035!!! 0:045!!! 0:036!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-Market 0:022!! 0:055!!! 0:053!!! 0:019! 0:054!!!
(0:011) (0:011) (0:011) (0:011) (0:011)
Leverage projection 0:096!! !0:092!! !0:112!! 0:110!! !0:086!
(0:048) (0:044) (0:044) (0:048) (0:044)
Renegotiation failure 0:118!!! 0:106!!!!0:044 !0:305!!! !0:209!
(0:027) (0:026) (0:049) (0:101) (0:114)
Insidersí share !0:086!!!!0:073!!!!0:275!!!
(0:027) (0:028) (0:065)
Intangibles !0:631!!! !1:186!!!
(0:054) (0:140)
Intangibles (with cash) 0:217!!! !0:115
(0:050) (0:127)
Insidersí share % Renegotiation 0:354!!!
failure (0:095)
Intangibles % 0:959!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:209)
Intangibles (with cash) % 0:576!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:195)
Constant 0:750!!! 0:434!!! 0:647!!! 0:940!!! 0:568!!!
(0:039) (0:044) (0:046) (0:068) (0:078)
Observations 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884
Average adjusted R2 0:05 0:03 0:03 0:05 0:03
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IV: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic 0:067! !0:195! 0:396!
Standard error (0:039) (0:082) (0:080)
H0 : E (ri ! rjRenegotiation failure = 1)! E (ri ! rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:083!!! 0:116!!! 0:115!!!
Standard error (0:023) (0:022) (0:022)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:265!!! 0:444!!! 0:315!!!
Standard error (0:065) (0:092) (0:093)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table V: Equity Beta, Renegotiation Frictions and Institutional Variables
Panel A of this table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of alternative deÖni-
tions of Örmís beta on proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation
costs (Intangibles), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation Failure), and Örm and
country controls. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample consists
of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the
Örmís Domestic Market Beta; in columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the Overall Market
beta for all stocks where the Karolyi and Stulz (2003) upper bound for asset pricing mistakes
from using the domestic CAPM when the world CAPM is correct exceeds 0.5% returns per
year, otherwise it is the Domestic Market beta; in columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is
the World Market beta for all stocks in all countries and years where the Bekaert et al. (2011)
segmentation measure is lower than the countryís median, otherwise it is the Domestic Market
beta. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in
parentheses. Panel B reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the estimates in panel
A, expressed in terms of average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stock market turnover "0:163!!! "0:138!!! "0:376!!! "0:326!!! "0:112!!! "0:088!!!
(0:009) (0:01) (0:027) (0:027) (0:011) (0:011)
Stock market cap to GDP "0:092!!! "0:092!!! "0:318!!! "0:320!!! "0:151!!! "0:152!!!
(0:013) (0:013) (0:025) (0:025) (0:012) (0:012)
Private credit to GDP 0:077!!! 0:082!!! 0:616!!! 0:622!!! 0:235!!! 0:242!!!
(0:014) (0:014) (0:045) (0:044) (0:017) (0:017)
Local Growth Opportunities "0:030!! "0:022! "0:055!! "0:047!! "0:062!!! "0:053!!!
(0:012) (0:011) (0:024) (0:024) (0:013) (0:013)
French 0:230!!! 0:174!!! 0:780!!! 0:666!!! 0:287!!! 0:229!!!
(0:024) (0:023) (0:063) (0:062) (0:037) (0:036)
German 0:203!!! 0:156!!! 0:416!!! 0:327!!! 0:098!!! 0:057!!!
(0:018) (0:018) (0:039) (0:038) (0:02) (0:02)
Scandinavian "0:037 "0:056!! 0:409!!! 0:368!!! 0:146!!! 0:133!!!
(0:025) (0:025) (0:061) (0:061) (0:031) (0:031)
Socialist 0:238! 0:13 1:173!!! 0:960!!! 0:408!!! 0:288!!!
(0:13) (0:127) (0:326) (0:33) (0:112) (0:111)
Size 0:021!!! 0:034!!! 0:071!!! 0:094!!! 0:046!!! 0:057!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:007) (0:007) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-market "0:01 "0:019! "0:054!!! "0:082!!! "0:005 "0:013
(0:011) (0:011) (0:02) (0:021) (0:01) (0:011)
Leverage projection "0:018 0:105!! 0:057 0:364!!! "0:03 0:083!
(0:041) (0:045) (0:079) (0:087) (0:041) (0:046)
Renegotiation failure 0:222!!! "0:038 0:539!!! 0:201 0:049 "0:109
(0:052) (0:1) (0:12) (0:203) (0:064) (0:115)
Insidersí share "0:422!!! "0:907!!! "0:532!!!
(0:063) (0:125) (0:065)
Insidersí share $ 0:328!!! 1:036!!! 0:575!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:096) (0:195) (0:101)
Intangibles "0:813!!! "1:788!!! "0:763!!!
(0:137) (0:256) (0:141)
Intangibles $ Renegotiation failure 0:872!!! 1:602!!! 0:842!!!
(0:201) (0:382) (0:212)
Constant 0:717!!! 0:779!!! 0:257 0:474!! 0:552!!! 0:558!!!
(0:063) (0:081) (0:172) (0:187) (0:083) (0:099)
Observations 351,099 351,099 351,099 351,099 347,211 347,211
Average adjusted R2 0:14 0:13 0:18 0:18 0:11 0:10
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table V: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test statistic "0:078!! 0:049 0:052 "0:079 0:036 0:066
Standard error (0:036) (0:075) (0:036) (0:072) (0:039) (0:082)
H0 : E (ri " rjRenegotiation failure = 1)" E (ri " rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:294!!! 0:299!!! 0:385!!! 0:374!!! 0:232!!! 0:228!!!
Standard error (0:030) (0:030) (0:036) (0:035) (0:040) (0:039)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:456!!! 0:588!!! 0:631!!! 0:630!!! 0:515!!! 0:506!!!
Standard error (0:057) (0:072) (0:058) (0:068) (0:063) (0:074)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table VI: Equity Beta, Renegotiation Frictions and Leverage
This table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic market beta on
proxies of liquidation costs (Intangibles), shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), and our
measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure). Sources and deÖnitions for all variables
are in Table I, and the full set of estimates is available in the online appendix. The sample consists of
monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. Each Örmís Domestic Market Beta is computed each month
from the regression of the past 60 monthly returns on its countryís contemporaneous market return.
The estimates in Panel A are for the two subsamples of High Leverage (HL) and Low Leverage
(LL) Örms. The HL and the LL subsample includes, respectively, the top and bottom three deciles
of the distribution of Leverage projection. Leverage projection is the orthogonal projection of the
Örmís Leverage in year t > 0 on Renegotiation failure, the Örmís initial Leverage (year t = 0), the
countryís statutory corporate tax rate, the Örmís Intangibles, Insidersí share, Size and Book-to-
market, and yearly dummies. Standard errors adjusted for correlation within Örms and time are
reported in parentheses. This panel also reports statistics for the sensitivity of the equity beta to
Renegotiation failure implied by the parameter estimates and evaluated at di§erent values of the
proxies for liquidation costs and shareholderís bargaining power. In Panel B, (HSD) and (LSD)
contain Örms in the top and bottom three deciles of the distribution of Short-term debt projection,
which is deÖned following the same method as for Leverage projection.
Panel A: Estimates conditional on subsamples deÖned by Leverage
(1) (2)
LL HL LL HL
Renegotiation failure "0:111 "0:042 "0:154 "0:814!!!
(0:087) (0:084) (0:158) (0:197)
Insidersí share "0:485!!! "0:170
(0:107) (0:108)
Insidersí share $ 0:416!! 0:433!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:164) (0:159)
Intangibles "1:015!!! "1:849!!!
(0:231) (0:268)
Intangibles $ 0:692! 1:931!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:366) (0:392)
Observations 113,284 112,837 113,284 112,837
Average adjusted R2 0:04 0:04 0:04 0:07
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@&
@ Renegotiation failure
jHL "
@&
@ Renegotiation failure
jLL = 0
@&
@ Renegotiation failure
evaluated at:
Average Intangibles or
Insidersí share 0:063 0:126!!! 0:131!!! 0:134!!!
Standard error (0:044) (0:047) (0:044) (0:045)
Intangibles or
Insidersí share = 1 0:305!!! 0:391!!! 0:539!! 1:117!!!
Standard error (0:099) (0:101) (0:219) (0:205)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
(Continues)
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Table VI: continued
Panel B: Estimates conditional on subsamples deÖned by Short-term debt
(1) (2)
LSD HSD LSD HSD
Renegotiation failure 0:085 !0:272!!!!0:450!!! !0:100
(0:080) (0:095) (0:163) (0:199)
Insidersí share !0:146 !0:601!!!
(0:110) (0:116)
Insidersí share % 0:299!! 0:772!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:161) (0:179)
Intangibles !1:255!!! !1:023!!!
(0:210) (0:299)
Intangibles % 1:297!!! 0:531
Renegotiation failure (0:308) (0:450)
Observations 104,669 104,255 104,669 104,255
Average adjusted R2 0:02 0:05 0:05 0:06
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@$
@ Renegotiation failure jHL !
@$
@ Renegotiation failure jLL = 0
@$
@ Renegotiation failure evaluated at:
Average Intangibles or
Insidersí share 0:201!!! 0:059 0:176!!! 0:129!!
Standard error (0:045) (0:051) (0:044) (0:051)
Intangibles or
Insidersí share = 1 0:384!!! 0:500!!! 0:847!!! 0:432
Standard error (0:104) (0:111) (0:157) (0:263)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table VII: Robustness Analysis
This table presents robustness results of pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domes-
tic Market Beta on proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs
(Intangibles), and alternative measures of renegotiation frictions. Sources and deÖnitions for all
variables are in Table I, and the full set of estimates is available in the online appendix. The sample
period consists of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. The Örmís Domestic Market Beta is com-
puted for every month from the regression of the latest 60 historical monthly returns on its countryís
contemporaneous market return. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time,
and are reported in parentheses. In Panel A, our measure of renegotiation frictions is Renegotiation
failure. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates for a subsample of Örms with the proportion of foreign
sales or foreign assets below a 5% threshold. Columns 3 and 4 report the results for a subsample of
countries that have never changed their bankruptcy code between 1993 and 2005. Panel B reports
estimates for the full sample of Örms and countries, but uses the index of priority at which creditors
are served in default (Priority), and the creditorsí recovery rate (Creditorsí recovery) as alternative
measures of debt renegotiation frictions.
Panel A: Excluding multinational Örms or years before last bankruptcy code change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Renegotiation failure 0:323!!! "0:209 0:245!!! "0:009
(0:098) (0:209) (0:053) (0:102)
Insidersí share "0:324!! "0:434!!!
(0:136) (0:064)
Intangibles "1:219!!! "0:828!!!
(0:271) (0:139)
Insidersí share $ Renegotiation failure 0:328 0:330!!!
(0:206) (0:096)
Intangibles $ Renegotiation failure 1:474!!! 0:848!!!
(0:414) (0:204)
Observations 101,827 101,827 342,672 342,672
Adjusted R2 0:22 0:22 0:14 0:13
Panel B: Creditorsí priority and recovery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priority "0:103!!! 0:169!!!
(0:023) (0:042)
Recovery "0:719!!! 0:166
(0:090) (0:115)
Insidersí share "0:920!!! "0:791!!!
(0:132) (0:082)
Intangibles 1:079!!! 0:449!!
(0:351) (0:195)
Insidersí share $ Priority 0:174!!!
(0:035)
Intangibles $ Priority "0:362!!!
(0:091)
Insidersí share $ Creditorsí recovery 0:739!!!
(0:103)
Intangibles $ Creditorsí recovery "0:890!!!
(0:237)
Observations 351,099 351,099 351,333 351,333
Adjusted R2 0:12 0:11 0:14 0:13
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
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Table VIII: Volatility, Renegotiation Frictions and Institutional Variables
This table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís volatility on proxies
for shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles), and our
measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation Failure). Sources and deÖnitions for all
variables are in Table I, and the full set of estimates is available in the online appendix.
The sample period consists of all monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In columns 1
and 2, the dependent variable is Total return volatility, deÖned as the annualized standard
deviation of monthly stock returns over the past 60-month window. In columns 3 and 4, the
dependent variable is Systematic return volatility, deÖned as the annualized square root of
the di§erence between the variance of monthly stock returns and the variance of residuals
from a regression of monthly returns on the lagged, contemporaneous, and lead domestic
market index. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is Idiosyncratic return volatility,
deÖned as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of monthly
returns on the lagged, contemporaneous, and lead domestic market index. Standard errors
are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Renegotiation failure "0:073!!! "0:069!!! "0:012 "0:031 "0:078!!! "0:069!!!
(0:013) (0:026) (0:012) (0:022) (0:011) (0:021)
Insidersí share "0:080!!! "0:106!!! "0:030!!
(0:017) (0:014) (0:013)
Insidersí share $ 0:105!!! 0:145!!! 0:031
Renegotiation failure (0:024) (0:02) (0:02)
Intangibles "0:149!!! "0:176!!! "0:073!!!
(0:033) (0:029) (0:027)
Intangibles $ Renegotiation failure 0:076 0:159!!! 0:005
(0:049) (0:042) (0:04)
Volatility(q=1) - Volatility(q=0) "2:50% "3:82% 5:42% 3:34% "6:38% "6:70%
Observations 351,082 351,082 351,082 351,082 351,082 351,082
Average adjusted R2 0:08 0:09 0:11 0:11 0:17 0:18
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table IX: Stock Returns and Renegotiation Frictions
This table shows average monthly returns for portfolios of stocks sorted by our measure of
renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure) and by proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power
(Insidersí share) and liquidation costs (Intangibles). Panel A shows the average raw, market-
adjusted, and BM-size-market-adjusted returns for Örms in the low quartile (LQ, where Rene-
gotiation failure < 0.42 ) and the high quartile (HQ, where Renegotiation failure > 0.67 ).
The market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the contemporaneous domestic mar-
ket return from the Örmís individual stock return. The BM-size-market-adjusted returns are
computed by subtracting the contemporaneous domestic market return from the Örmsí BM-
size-adjusted returns. The BM-size-adjusted returns take into account the premia associated
with book-to-market and size. We compute these adjustments across all countries and within
each country using a three-by-three sort. Panel B shows the average BM-size-market-adjusted
stock returns for portfolios of Örms sorted into the within-country terciles of Insidersí share
or Intangibles. Di§erence of means tests are based on Studentís t tests. The sample period
consists of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables
are in Table I.
Panel A: Monthly stock returns for Renegotiation failure quartiles
LQ HQ HQ - LQ
Raw (Mean/Std. Error) 1.708 (0:043) 1.831 (0.036) 0:123!!
Market adjusted (Mean/Std. Error) 0.122 (0:039) 0.535 (0.034) 0:412!!!
BM-size-mkt across adj. (Mean/Std. Error) -1.286 (0:044) -0.871 (0.038) 0:415!!!
BM-size-mkt within adj. (Mean/Std. Error) -1.578 (0:043) -1.340 (0.037) 0:238!!!
Panel B: Monthly stock returns across terciles for Insidersí share and Intangibiles
LQ HQ
Insidersí Share Tercile 1 T3 T1 - T3 T1 T3 T1 - T3
BM-size-market across adjusted -1.159 -1.189 !0:03 -0.798 -0.978 !0:179!
BM-size-market within adjusted -1.075 -1.079 !0:004 -1.245 -1.412 !0:167!
Intangibles Tercile 1 T3 T1 - T3 T1 T3 T1 - T3
BM-size-market across adjusted -1.091 -1.256 !0:165!!!-0.930 -0.887 0:043
BM-size-market within adjusted -0.961 -1.163 !0:202!!!-1.397 -1.369 0:029
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance
levels, respectively.
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Table A I: Domestic vs. World Betas
This table summarizes the means of beta estimates and other statistics by country. The R2wd is the R-squared of the regression
of world market returns on domestic market returns. V ar(ri)
V ar(rw)
is the average ratio of individual Örmsí variance to the variance
of world returns. Upper bound is the Karolyi and Stulz (2003) upper bound for the asset pricing mistake of using the domestic
CAPM, when the world CAPM is the correct model. 6id is the domestic market beta, 6iw is the world market beta, and
6SWid is the Scholes and Williams (1977) beta using the domestic market index. The sample period goes from 1993 to 2006.
Proportion of
R2wd
V ar(ri)
V ar(rw)
Upper bound signiÖcant 6iw 6id 6iw
j$idj
j$idj+j$iwj
6SWid
Australia 0:564 5:426 0.688 0.692 0:923 0:771 0:572 0:706
Austria 0:241 4:943 0.893 0.346 0:831 0:426 0:642 0:457
Belgium 0:390 4:657 0.802 0.564 0:784 0:666 0:519 0:745
Brazil 0:509 11:454 0.898 1.000 0:867 1:721 0:329 1:679
Canada 0:655 6:805 0.732 0.533 0:756 0:726 0:522 0:743
Chile 0:318 6:648 0.892 0.542 0:891 0:624 0:597 0:827
China 0:074 7:061 1.281 0.017 0:347 0:119 0:618 0:256
Denmark 0:407 5:832 0.917 0.291 0:567 0:450 0:561 0:538
Finland 0:441 6:104 0.893 0.517 0:340 0:738 0:249 0:779
France 0:675 6:317 0.685 0.404 0:634 0:630 0:563 0:767
Germany 0:609 5:582 0.700 0.314 0:494 0:508 0:525 0:475
Greece 0:263 10:389 1.181 0.436 0:993 0:766 0:595 0:904
Hong Kong 0:432 5:976 0.750 0.665 0:699 0:804 0:485 0:801
Ireland 0:523 5:684 0.778 0.609 0:760 0:728 0:501 1:059
Israel 0:257 7:777 0.934 0.802 1:067 1:110 0:488 1:391
Italy 0:497 6:321 0.775 0.649 0:850 0:866 0:479 0:975
Japan 0:398 8:110 0.948 0.448 0:926 0:809 0:595 1:214
Korea 0:469 11:309 1.109 0.665 0:727 1:106 0:413 1:073
(Continues)
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Table AI: Continued
Proportion of
R2wd
V ar(ri)
V ar(rw)
Upper bound signiÖcant 6iw 6id 6iw
j$idj
j$idj+j$iwj
6SWid
Malaysia 0:121 5:867 0.857 0.333 0:747 0:556 0:594 0:586
Mexico 0:480 7:872 0.843 0.558 0:716 0:947 0:424 1:100
Netherlands 0:682 5:170 0.603 0.527 0:717 0:669 0:559 0:763
New Zealand 0:357 4:601 0.732 0.731 0:881 0:715 0:560 0:570
Norway 0:467 6:970 0.849 0.750 0:874 0:983 0:452 1:023
Peru 0:124 4:582 0.896 0.243 0:359 0:361 0:427 0:526
Philippines 0:155 6:823 0.944 0.602 0:800 0:887 0:540 1:346
Poland 0:345 8:262 1.004 0.723 0:798 1:070 0:406 1:058
Portugal 0:338 4:989 0.824 0.410 0:755 0:545 0:611 0:610
Russia 0:228 12:308 1.398 0.378 0:741 0:960 0:420 1:199
Singapore 0:382 5:603 0.788 0.668 0:861 0:809 0:530 0:764
South Africa 0:271 8:231 1.097 0.430 0:810 0:670 0:569 0:681
Spain 0:590 5:167 0.655 0.657 0:760 0:777 0:525 0:927
Sweden 0:587 7:195 0.758 0.713 0:709 0:987 0:399 0:885
Switzerland 0:500 5:544 0.801 0.492 0:772 0:649 0:551 1:000
Taiwan 0:278 9:140 1.126 0.359 0:794 0:702 0:571 0:815
Thailand 0:239 6:131 1.042 0.365 0:370 0:514 0:457 0:449
Turkey 0:373 17:700 1.157 0.901 0:816 1:862 0:320 1:812
UK 0:717 6:120 0.644 0.441 0:758 0:634 0:572 0:845
USA 0:510 7:867 0.951 0.464 0:625 0:739 0:432 0:843
Average 0:489 7:302 0.868 0.473 0:772 0:746 0:533 0:951
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Table A II: First-stage Leverage Regressions
This table shows the OLS estimates of the regressions
Leverageit = G0 + G1 % Leveragei0 + G
0
z
zit + G
0
x
xC + H
L
it;
and
Short! termdebtit = !0 + !1 % Short! termdebti0 + !
0
z
zit + !
0
x
xC + H
ST
it ;
where Leverageit is the Örm iís market leverage at time t > 0, Leveragei0 is Örm iís initial leverage,
Short-term debt it is Örm iís short-term debt to total debt at time t > 0 and Short-term debt i0 is Örm
iís initial short term debt ratio. The vectors xc and zit include all country-speciÖc and Örm-month
speciÖc variables, respectively, which are listed below. All these variables are deÖned in Table I.
The sample period is from 1993 to 2006.
Leverage Short! term
debt
Estimates Standard Estimates Standard
Errors Errors
Leveragei0 0:604
!!! (0:001)
Short-term debt i0 1:042
!!! (0:001)
Renegotiation failure 0:013!!! (0:001) !0:034!!! (0:004)
Statutory Tax Rate 0:001!!! (0:000) 0:004!!! (0:000)
Size 0:001!!! (0:000) !0:007!!! (0:001)
Book-to-Market 0:001!!! (0:000) 0:008!!! (0:001)
Insidersí share !0:022!!! (0:002) 0:059!!! (0:004)
Intangibility 0:281!!! (0:002) !0:268!!! (0:008)
Constant !0:071!!! (0:002) 0:022!!! (0:009)
Year Dummies yes yes
F statistic 38; 665:751 83; 868:371
Observations 370,518 325,426
Average adjusted R2 0:65 0:83
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table A III: Equity Beta and Renegotiation Frictions
This table shows the estimates of the regression of the di§erence between the Örmís beta and the
average beta of all Örms in the same country-month on proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power
(Insidersí share) and liquidation costs (Intangibles). All Örm-speciÖc variables are in deviation from
the average of all Örms in the same country-month. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are
in Table I, and the full set of estimates is available in the online Appendix. The sample period
consists of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable
is the Örmís Domestic Market Beta computed for every month from the regression of the latest 60
historical monthly returns on the contemporaneous domestic market return; in columns 3 and 4 it
is either the Domestic Market Beta or the Overall Market Beta depending on whether the Karolyi
and Stulz (2003) upper bound for asset pricing mistakes of using the domestic CAPM when the
world CAPM is the correct model is larger than 0.5% returns per year; in columns 5 and 6 it is
either the Domestic Market Beta or the World Market Beta depending on whether the Bekaert et
al. (2011) country-year segmentation measure of stocks that are not integrated to the world market
is lower than the countryís median. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and
time, and are reported in parentheses. The table also reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance
of the estimates, expressed in terms of average monthly excess returns, evaluated at the average and
maximum values of the proxies for Örmís liquidation costs and shareholderís bargaining power.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
!Insidersí share !0:310!!! !0:787!!! !0:454!!!
(0:064) (0:113) (0:065)
!Intangibles !0:608!!! !1:144!!! !0:608!!!
(0:126) (0:234) (0:133)
!(Insidersí share " Renegotiation 0:162 0:617!!! 0:361!!!
failure) (0:102) (0:181) (0:101)
!(Intangibles " 0:547!!! 0:887!! 0:591!!!
Renegotiation failure) (0:196) (0:348) (0:201)
Observations 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884
Average adjusted R2 0:03 0:02 0:04 0:03 0:06 0:05
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
Test statistic !0:125!!! !0:051 !0:072! !0:108 !0:079!! !0:014
Standard error (0:040) (0:076) (0:037) (0:070) (0:040) (0:079)
H0 : E (ri ! rjRenegotiation failure = 1)! E (ri ! rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:055 0:211!!! 0:104!!! 0:171!! 0:121!!! 0:228!!!
Standard error (0:034) (0:076) (0:031) (0:067) (0:034) (0:077)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:137 0:395!!! 0:259!!! 0:320!! 0:304!!! 0:426!!
Standard error (0:086) (0:141) (0:076) (0:126) (0:085) (0:145)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Figure 1: This Ögure shows the modelís simulated market beta as
a function of the liquidation costs, -, and the probability of renego-
tiation failure, q in the model with debt-equity swap. The modelís
parameters have been set to 0 = 0:35; X = 10; c = 6; r = 0:06; $ =
0:01; & = 0:4; + = 0:6:
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Notes
1The main drawback of a cross-country analysis is that our measures of equity risk may depend
on factors besides the bankruptcy code and Örmsí incentives to default strategically. In our analysis
we sample Örms from both developed and emerging countries, and in these countries capital markets
di§er substantially in terms of liquidity and integration with respect to the world capital market. To
overcome this drawback we follow the international asset pricing literature in order to control for the
standard determinants of cross-country equity risk.
2See for example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer
(2007). A comprehensive survey is in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
3Fan and Sundaresan (2000) discuss an alternative reorganization procedure. Under a ìstrategic
debt serviceî, debt payments are suspended until the Örmís cash áow recovers above XB: In exchange,
debt holders accept a fraction of the Örmís assets upon recovery. As discussed in Appendix 1, our
results and testable hypotheses hold under this alternative bargaining formulation.
4See Francois and Morellec (2004) and Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007) for alternative
speciÖcations to incorporate such frictions.
5Note that q summarizes frictions during both formal bankruptcy and out-of-court renegotiations.
Typically, shareholders Örst attempt an informal workout and then resort to formal bankruptcy. Ex
ante, shareholdersí payo§s from defaulting strategically depend on frictions to renegotiations that
they expect to meet through both stages. In theory, private contracts may undo these frictions by a
proper allocation of control rights over reorganization and liquidation decisions (Gennaioli and Rossi
(2011)). Here we assume that private contracts cannot fully over-ride bankruptcy regimes ñ a plausible
assumption in a world in which contracts are incomplete and enforcement is not perfect.
6The mechanism in our paper is similar to the one in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Bolton
and Sharsftein (1996), where a dispersed debt structure impedes renegotiations and deters strategic
default due to free-rider problems. The crucial di§erence is that in our paper renegotiation frictions
are tied to bankruptcy procedures which are exogenous to the Örmsí capital structure.
7If the Örmís cash áow had an additional risk component orthogonal to M , e.g., idiosyncratic risk,
the market beta would be proportional to the the modelís overall equity beta, scaled by the correlation
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coe¢cient between X and the market portfolio M (see Garlappi and Yan (2011)).
8The relation between the equity beta, q and +; is qualitatively identical, and thus not shown.
9For example, Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010) Önd that in countries with stronger creditor
rights, Örms choose investments with lower cash áow risk.
10An alternative approach to identify the e§ect of the bankruptcy code on equity risk is to do a
di§erence-in-di§erences analysis around changes in the bankruptcy code within countries. The paucity
of such changes in our sample, however, renders this alternative approach infeasible.
11For the US, the maximum Priority score is consistent with the fact that absolute priority vi-
olations, conditional on Öling for Chapter 11, have become extremely rare since the 90s (Bharath,
Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007) and Ayotte and Morrison (2009)). The fact that the US has a
Renegotiation failure index equal to the sample mean conÖrms that this index more broadly cap-
tures what shareholders can expect from a renegotiation in or out-of-court. The relatively average
Renegotiation failure value for the US is explained by a combination of strong creditorís rights in
Chapter 11 (e.g., the creditorsí rights to vote on a reorganization) but relatively strong managerís
rights (e.g., automatic stay of management) and shareholdersí rights during out-of-court workouts
(e.g., a reorganization must be attempted).
12The creditorsí expected recovery rate, conditional on default, is
R #
(1! q)(1! +-)XB + q(1! -)XB
c
r
=
1
1! 1
.
1!
-q
1! (1! q)+-
/
:
It thus follows that @R
@q
> 0 and @
2R
@q2
< 0: Intuitively, conditional on default, an increase in q makes
liquidation more likely but delays the default timing, decreasing the value of assets upon liquidation.
13Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2011) exclude stocks with more than 30% zero weekly returns. None
of our Öndings are a§ected when we apply this less stringent Ölter.
14The authors show that the asset pricing mistake is small when (i) the domestic market portfolio
is strongly correlated with the world portfolio and (ii) the stockís volatility is low relative to the world
market portfolioís.
15Due to data limitations we are not able to construct proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power
based on the tenure of managers, the investment of human capital, and the concentration of creditors,
as Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) do.
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16The results of using Leverage instead of Leverage projection are qualitatively identical. However,
the sensitivity of the equity beta to q is higher when we use Leverage projection. Our interpretation
is that the endogenous component of Leverage is a substitute for strategic default in countries where
q is high. If it is not removed, it biases downward the estimated sensitivity of beta to q:
17We use the countriesí statutory tax rates reported by Djankov et al. (2010).
18Such unobservable characteristics could include, for example, the treatment of tax carry-forwards
in bankruptcy or the costs of renegotiation outside a formal insolvency procedure.
19Adams and Fincke (2008) argue that these two model laws have been adopted by many countries
outside the European Union, including the United States, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand,
Japan, Eritrea, Montenegro, Mexico, South Africa and many others.
20The prevailing view in the legal literature is that changing the COMI is a complicated procedure
(Pottow (2007)), because it requires not only that the Örm moves its place of incorporation, but also
that third parties consider the new location as the place where the Örm conducts its main business
(see, however, LoPucki (2005)). Furthermore, there is evidence that other factors, such as business
reasons or tax laws a§ect the choice of incorporation of a Örm (Rasmussen (2007)).
21Japan also went through two important reforms in 2000 and 2002. However, the 2002 reform
undid the changes introduced in 2000. Thus, for the purpose of our paper, we take that Japan has
not changed its bankruptcy code.
22IdentiÖcation of the strategic default e§ect may be complicated by the possibility of signiÖcant
covariance between the recovery rate and the countryís business cycle. In a boom, creditors could
expect a higher recovery rate than in a recession, ceteris paribus. We control for the interaction
between the recovery rate and the Hodrick-Prescott Öltered GDP series. We Önd a strong positive and
signiÖcant coe¢cient, conÖrming this conjecture.
23In July of each year, we sort the Örms in our sample into size terciles, and within each Size tercile
into Book-to-Market terciles. We subtract the average returns within each of these nine portfolios
from the Örmís individual stock return. We do these sorts either within each country, or across all
countries.
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Internet Appendix for
"Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries"!
This internet appendix contains supplemental material to the paper ëStrategic Default and Equity
Risk Across Countriesí. Part A contains the derivation of the model from the main text. Part B shows
results not reported in the main text due to space constraints. We present the results in order they
appear in the main text. All variables are deÖned in Table I of the paper.
The Ögures and tables in part B represent:
" Figure IA. 1: illustrates the predicted relation between the equity beta and liquidation costs, !;
under the alternative "strategic debt service" arrangement.
" Table IA.1: displays the robustness of Table IV in the paper to changing the criterion to drop
Örms with at least six consecutive zero returns.
" Table IA.2: displays the robustness of Table IV in the paper to changing the beta.
" Table IA.3: displays the full set of estimates corresponding to the abridged Table A.3 in the
paper.
" Table IA.4: displays the full set of estimates corresponding to the abridged Table VI in the
paper.
!Citation format: Favara, Giovanni, Enrique Schroth, and Philip Valta, [Year], Internet Appendix to "Strategic
Default and Equity Risk Across Countries", Journal of Finace [Vol], [pages], http://www.afajof.org/IA/[Year].asp. Please
note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the
authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the article.
1
" Table IA.5: displays the full set of estimates corresponding to the abridged Table VII in the
paper.
" Table IA.6: displays the full set of estimates corresponding to the abridged Table VIII in the
paper.
" Table IA.7: displays the robustness of Table V in the paper to dropping Örms which, under
di§erent criteria, may have the choice to Öle for bankruptcy in a di§erent country than where it
is incorporated.
" Table IA.8: displays the robustness of Table IV in the paper to dropping observations in the US
or Japan.
" Table IA.9: displays the robustness of Table V in the paper to using the Scholes and Williams
(1977) betas as a dependent variable.
" Table IA.10: displays the robustness of Table IV in the paper to a Fama and MacBeth (1973)
estimator.
" Table IA.11: displays the robustness of Table IV in the paper to matching Örms using a Gener-
alized Propensity Score matching estimator.
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Internet Appendix A. Proofs and Derivations
Case 1: Debt-for-Equity Swap
The Örmís assets in place generate an operating cash áow X that evolves according to a geometric
Brownian motion with constant growth rate $ > 0 and constant volatility &X ,
dXt = $Xtdt+ &XXtdBt:
The instantaneous proÖt is Xt#c, where c is the coupon payment. No-arbitrage implies that after-tax
cash áow (1# ,) (Xt # c) plus capital gains equal the risk free return. Thus, the value of equity E(X)
satisÖes the following di§erential equation:
1
2
&2XX
2EXX + $XEX + (1# ,) (X # c) = rE;
with boundary conditions:
lim
X"1
E(X)=X $ 1;
lim
X#XB
E(X) = (1# q)1!
XB
r # $
(1# ,) ;
lim
X#XB
EX(X) = (1# q)1!
1
r # $
(1# ,) :
The general solution to this ordinary di§erential equation is
E (X) = AX$1 +BX$ + (1# ,)
!
X
r # $
#
c
r
"
,
with constants A and B determined by boundary conditions, and 31 and 3 given by
31 =
!
1
2
#
$
&2X
"
+
s!
1
2
#
$
&2X
"2
+
2r
&2X
> 0;
32 =
!
1
2
#
$
&2X
"
#
s!
1
2
#
$
&2X
"2
+
2r
&2X
< 0:
The Örst and second boundary condition imply that A = 0 and
B =
$
(1# q)1!
XB
r # $
(1# ,)# (1# ,)
!
XB
r # $
#
c
r
"%!
1
XB
"$
:
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Moreover, using the fact that
lim
X#XB
E(X) = lim
X#XB
EX(X)X;
the endogenous default threshold XB can be written as
XB =
r # $
r
3
3# 1
c
1# (1# q)!1
: (A1)
Finally, replacing XB into E (X), the value of equity simpliÖes to
E (X) = (1# ,)
"!
X
r # $
#
c
r
"
+
!
c
r
1
1# 3
"!
X
XB
"$#
: (A2)
Equity Beta
To price equity, we apply Itoís lemma to (A2), obtaining
dEt =
!
$Xt
@E
@X
+
1
2
&2XX
2
t EXX
"
dt+ &Xt
@E
@X
dt:
These dynamics can be continuously replicated by holding a portfolio with a time-varying weight in
X, wt; satisfying
dE
E
= wt &
dX
X
: (1)
By inspection, wt =
@E
@X
Xt
Et
: The equity beta, deÖned as 7E '
Cov( dEE ;
dX
X )
V ar( dXX )
; simpliÖes to
7E =
Cov
(
wt &
dX
X
; dX
X
)
V ar
(
dX
X
) = wt
=
@E
@X
Xt
Et
:
From (A1) and (A2) we get
7E =
@E
@X
Xt
Et
=
(1# 3)Xt= (r # $)# 3c=r
Et=(1# ,)
+ 3
= 1 +
(1# ,)
Et
c
r
#
(1# ,)
Et
c
r
!
Xt
XB
"$
:
If the market portfolio is perfectly correlated with Xt; then 7E is equal to the market beta.
Alternatively, if the market portfolio, Mt; is not perfectly correlated with Xt then the market beta is
7ME '
Cov
(
dE
E
; dM
M
)
V ar
(
dM
M
) = Cov (wt & dXX ; dMM )
V ar
(
dM
M
) = 7E & 7X ;
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where 7X is the Örmís asset beta.
Return volatility
DeÖne the total return variance as &2E ' V ar
(
dE
E
)
: Using (1), we have
&2E = V ar
!
wt &
dX
X
"
= w2t &
2
X = (7E&X)
2 ;
and the total volatility is &E = 7E&X :
Comparative Statics
Substituting for the optimal default threshold in (A1) into (A2); the after-tax value of equity
becomes
E = (1# ,)
"!
X
r # $
#
c
r
"
+
!
c
r
1
1# 3
"!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!))
(r # $)3c
"$#
:
Since 3 < 0; it follows that
@E
@!
=
c
r
3
1# 3| {z }
$
!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)
(r # $)3c
"$
| {z }
+
(#(1# q)1)(r # $)3c
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)| {z }
$
> 0
and
lim
q!1
@E
@!
= 0:
Also
@E
@1
=
c
r
3
1# 3| {z }
$
!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)
(r # $)3c
"$
| {z }
+
(#(1# q)!)(r # $)3c
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)| {z }
$
> 0
and
lim
q!1
@E
@1
= 0:
Finally
@E
@q
=
c
r
3
1# 3| {z }
$
!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)
(r # $)3c
"$
| {z }
+
1!(r # $)3c
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)| {z }
+
< 0
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Notice also that
@2E
@!@q
=
c
r
1
1# 3
32(r # $)c
rX(3# 1)| {z }
$
!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)
(r # $)3c
"$
| {z }
+
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
1!(r # $)32c
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)| {z }
$
#(1# q)!
1# (1# q)1!| {z }
$
+
1q (1# (1# q)1!) + (1# q)12!
(1# (1# q)1!)2| {z }
+
9>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>;
< 0;
@2E
@1@q
=
c
r
1
1# 3
32(r # $)c
rX(3# 1)| {z }
$
!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)
(r # $)3c
"$
| {z }
+
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
1!(r # $)32c
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)| {z }
$
#(1# q)!
1# (1# q)1!| {z }
$
+
!q (1# (1# q)1!) + (1# q)!21
(1# (1# q)1!)2| {z }
+
9>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>;
< 0;
and
@2E
@c@q
=
!
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!
(r # $)3c
"$
| {z }
+
1!(r # $)32c
Xr(3# 1)(1# (1# q)1!)r (1# 3)| {z }
$
(2# 3)| {z }
+
< 0:
Using the fact that,
7E =
+(1# ,)
E
+ 3;
where
+ = X= (r # $)# 3(X= (r # $)# c=r) > 0;
we have
@7E
@!
=
@7E
@E
@E
@!
= #
+(1# ,)
E2| {z }
$
@E
@!|{z}
+
< 0
@7E
@1
=
@7E
@E
@E
@1
= #
+(1# ,)
E2| {z }
$
@E
@1|{z}
+
< 0;
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@7E
@q
=
@7E
@E
@E
@q
= #
+(1# ,)
E2| {z }
$
@E
@q|{z}
$
> 0;
Moreover,
@27E
@!@q
=
@7E
@E
@2E
@!@q
= #
+(1# ,)
E2| {z }
$
@2E
@!@q| {z }
$
> 0;
@27E
@1@q
=
@7E
@E
@2E
@1@q
= #
+(1# ,)
E2| {z }
$
@2E
@1@q| {z }
$
> 0:
Further, @$
@c
> 0 and @E
@c
< 0 imply that
@27E
@c@q
=
@7E
@E
@2E
@c@q
+
@E
@q
@27E
@E@c
= #
+(1# ,)
E2| {z }
$
@2E
@c@q| {z }
$
+
@
@c
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#
+(1# ,)
E2
6
| {z }
$
@E
@q|{z}
$
> 0:
Finally,
lim
q!1
@7E
@!
= lim
q!1
@7E
@E
@E
@!
= #
+(1# ,)
E2
@E
@!
= 0;
lim
q!1
@7E
@1
= lim
q!1
@7E
@E
@E
@1
= #
+(1# ,)
E2
@E
@1
= 0:
Summarizing,
Lemma IA1: The equity beta is:
1. increasing in q;
2. decreasing in ! and 1;
3. less sensitive (in absolute value) to ! and 1 as q increases;
4. insensitive to ! and 1 for q = 1;
5. more sensitive to q as c increases.
Case 2: Strategic Debt Service
As discussed in Fan and Sundaresan (2000), an alternative to the equity-swap procedure is the
ìstrategic debt serviceî, in which debt holders (at the endogenously determined trigger point) accept a
7
reduced level of debt payment but let the Örm continue operations. The reduced debt payment enables
shareholders to get potential tax beneÖts in the future, and the present value of such tax beneÖts is
included in the bargaining process with debt holders. Following Fan and Sundaresan (2000), and using
the same steps as above, the value of equity for X > XB and the endogenous default threshold XB
can be written as
E(X) = (1# ,)
!
X
r # $
#
c
r
"
+
$
(1# ,) c
(1# 3) r
# 1(1# q)
3 (1# 31)
(31 # 3) (1# 3)
,c
r
%!
X
XB
"$1
XB =
r # $
1# ,
3
3# 1
c
r
!
1# , + ,1 (1# q)
1# !1 (1# q)
"
The equity beta is derived as in the model with debt-for-equity swap. The implications of this alter-
native set-up are thus identical the ones discussed in the main text. They are illustrated in Figure
IA.1
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Internet Appendix B. Figures and Tables
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Figure IA. 1: This Ögure shows the modelís simulated market beta
as a function of the liquidation costs, !, and the probability of rene-
gotiation failure, q in the model with strategic debt service. The
modelís parameters have been set to , = 0:35; X = 10; c = 6; r =
0:06; $ = 0:01; & = 0:4; 1 = 0:6:
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Table IA.1: Equity Beta and Renegotiation Frictions: Dropping Firms
Panel A of this table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic market
beta on proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles
and Intangibles (with cash)), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure), and
Örm-speciÖc controls. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample consists
of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In this Table, we drop Örms that have more than
six consecutive zero returns. Each Örmís domestic market beta is computed each month from
the regression of the past 60 monthly returns on the domestic marketís contemporaneous return.
Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses.
Panel B reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the estimates in panel A, expressed in
terms of average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0:041!!! 0:032!!! 0:034!!! 0:044!!! 0:035!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-Market 0:021! 0:054!!! 0:052!!! 0:018! 0:053!!!
(0:011) (0:011) (0:011) (0:011) (0:011)
Leverage projection 0:101!! #0:086!! #0:106!! 0:115!! #0:080!
(0:047) (0:043) (0:043) (0:047) (0:044)
Renegotiation failure 0:116!!! 0:104!!! #0:046 #0:296!!! #0:205!
(0:027) (0:026) (0:049) (0:101) (0:114)
Insidersí share #0:088!!! #0:075!!! #0:276!!!
(0:027) (0:028) (0:064)
Intangibles #0:632!!! #1:172!!!
(0:053) (0:140)
Intangibles (with cash) 0:211!!! #0:115
(0:049) (0:126)
Insidersí share & Renegotiation 0:353!!!
failure (0:095)
Intangibles & 0:935!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:210)
Intangibles (with cash) & 0:567!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:195)
Constant 0:758!!! 0:444!!! 0:654!!! 0:939!!! 0:573!!!
(0:038) (0:044) (0:046) (0:068) (0:078)
F statistic 3; 017:734 1; 536:369 1; 559:617 3; 024:600 1; 521:461
Observations 384,511 384,511 384,511 384,511 384,511
Average adjusted R2 0:05 0:03 0:03 0:05 0:03
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.1: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic 0:066! #0:202!! 0:385!!!
Standard error (0:039) (0:082) (0:080)
H0 : E (ri # rjRenegotiation failure = 1)# E (ri # rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:081!!! 0:113!!! 0:112!!!
Standard error (0:023) (0:022) (0:022)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:262!!! 0:431!!! 0:310!!!
Standard error (0:051) (0:074) (0:074)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table IA. 2: Robustness to Alternative DeÖnitions of Beta
Panel A of this table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of alternative deÖnitions of
Örmís beta on proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangi-
bles and Intangibles (with cash)), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure), and
Örm-speciÖc controls. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample consists
of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the Örmís
Overall Market beta for all stocks, computed as the sum of the beta of the regression of the Örmís
monthly returns on the contemporaneous MSCI World index returns and the residuals of the regres-
sion of the domestic market returns on the MSCI World returns, using 60 months rolling windows.
In columns 4 to 6, the dependent variable is the World Market beta for all stocks, computed from
the regression of the past 60 monthly returns on the contemporaneous MSCI World index returns.
Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses.
Panel B reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the estimates in panel A, expressed in
terms of average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size 0:069!!! 0:090!!! 0:069!!! 0:061!!! 0:075!!! 0:064!!!
(0:009) (0:008) (0:008) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
Book-to-market 0:073!!! #0:009 0:077!!! #0:022! #0:059!!! #0:021!
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023) (0:012) (0:014) (0:012)
Leverage projection #0:131 0:411!!! #0:087 0:037 0:288!!! 0:090!
(0:091) (0:110) (0:091) (0:053) (0:072) (0:052)
Renegotiation failure #0:235!! #0:665!!! #0:406! #0:356!!! #0:388!!! #0:226!
(0:092) (0:190) (0:222) (0:051) (0:112) (0:127)
Insidersí share #0:562!!! #0:592!!!
(0:063) (0:065)
Insidersí share & 0:864!!! 0:780!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:179) (0:107)
Intangibles #2:654!!! #1:185!!!
(0:297) (0:178)
Intangibles & 1:837!!! 0:888!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:395) (0:232)
Intangibles (with cash) #0:140 0:111
(0:256) (0:153)
Intangibles (with cash) & 0:950!!! 0:411!
Renegotiation failure (0:377) (0:224)
Constant 1:332!!! 2:014!!! 1:144!!! 0:646!!! 0:761!!! 0:268!!!
(0:098) (0:135) (0:155) (0:053) (0:079) (0:087)
F statistic 1; 289:95 3; 174:24 1; 286:10 4; 030:99 4; 241:21 3; 614:19
Observations 376,890 376,890 376,890 376,890 376,890 376,890
Average adjusted R2 0:02 0:05 0:02 0:06 0:06 0:05
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.2: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test statistic 0:111!! $0:299!!! 0:296!!! 0:137!!!$0:216!! 0:382!!!
Standard error (0:033) (0:071) (0:064) (0:043) (0:094) (0:077)
H0 : E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 1)$ E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:040!! 0:065!!! 0:058!!!$0:033 0:014 0:013
Standard error (0:019) (0:018) (0:013) (0:022) (0:021) (0:021)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:229!!! 0:332!!! 0:198!!! 0:310!!! 0:273!!! 0:135!!!
Standard error (0:043) (0:059) (0:061) (0:053) (0:069) (0:075)
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Table IA. 3: Equity Beta and Renegotiation Frictions
This table shows the full set of estimates of the regression of the di§erence between the Örmís
beta and the average beta of all Örms in the same country-month on proxies for shareholdersí
bargaining power (Insidersí share) and liquidation costs (Intangibles and Intangibles (with
cash)) (see Table A.3 in the paper). All Örm-speciÖc variables are in deviation from the
average of all Örms in the same country. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in
Table I. The sample period consists of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In Panel A,
the dependent variable is the Örmís Domestic Market Beta computed for every month from
the regression of the latest 60 historical monthly returns on the contemporaneous domestic
market return. In Panel B the dependent variable is either the Domestic Market Beta or
the Overall Market Beta depending on whether the Karolyi and Stulz (2003) upper bound
for asset pricing mistakes of using the domestic CAPM when the world CAPM is the correct
model is larger than 0.5% returns per year. In Panel C, the dependent variable is either
the Domestic Market Beta or the World Market Beta depending on whether the Bekaert,
Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) country-year segmentation measure of stocks that are
not integrated to the world market is lower than the countryís median. Standard errors are
adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses. The table
also reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the estimates, expressed in terms of
average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Domestic Market Betas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
!Size 0:020!!! 0:014!!! 0:016!!! 0:028!!! 0:023!!!
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
!Book-to-Market !0:019! !0:007 !0:010 !0:018! !0:004
(0:010) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010)
!Leverage projection 0:100!! 0:028 0:012 0:124!!! 0:042
(0:042) (0:039) (0:039) (0:043) (0:040)
!Insidersí share !0:214!!! !0:217!!! !0:310!!!
(0:022) (0:022) (0:064)
!Intangibles !0:275!!! !0:608!!!
(0:048) (0:126)
!Intangibles (with cash) 0:211!!! !0:039
(0:050) (0:126)
!(Insidersí share " Renegotiation 0:162
failure) (0:102)
!(Intangibles " 0:547!!!
Renegotiation failure) (0:196)
!(Intangibles (with cash) " 0:436!!
Renegotiation failure) (0:197)
Constant 0:025!!! 0:028!!! 0:027!!! 0:023!!! 0:026!!!
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
F statistic 1; 994:513 1; 857:725 1; 729:677 1; 237:884 1; 062:013
Observations 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884
Average adjusted R2 0:03 0:03 0:03 0:02 0:02
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.3: continued
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic $0:125!!!$0:051 0:167!!!
Standard error (0:040) (0:076) (0:045)
H0 : E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 1)$ E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:055 0:211!!! 0:218!!!
Standard error (0:034) (0:076) (0:098)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:137 0:395!!! 0:368!!!
Standard error (0:086) (0:141) (0:166)
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Table IA.3: continued
Panel B: Domestic Market Betas or Overall Market Betas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
!Size 0:063!!! 0:052!!! 0:055!!! 0:080!!! 0:068!!!
(0:006) (0:007) (0:006) (0:006) (0:007)
!Book-to-Market !0:032! !0:007 !0:0102 !0:029 !0:001
(0:019) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
!Leverage projection 0:125!! !0:038 !0:067 0:172!! !0:009
(0:081) (0:075) (0:076) (0:083) (0:076)
!Insidersí share !0:428!!! !0:435!!! !0:787!!!
(0:042) (0:042) (0:113)
!Intangibles !0:600!!! !1:144!!!
(0:096) (0:234)
!Intangibles (with cash) 0:367!!! !0:037
(0:103) (0:237)
!(Insidersí share " Renegotiation 0:617!!!
failure) (0:181)
!(Intangibles " 0:887!!
Renegotiation failure) (0:348)
!(Intangibles (with cash) " 0:706!
Renegotiation failure) (0:362)
Constant 0:042!!! 0:047!!! 0:045!!! 0:038!!! 0:042!!!
(0:009) (0:009) (0:009) (0:009) (0:009)
F statistic 2; 814:119 2; 669:291 2; 643:600 2; 078:636 1; 915:123
Observations 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884
Average adjusted R2 0:04 0:04 0:04 0:03 0:03
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.3: continued
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic $0:072! $0:108 0:281!!!
Standard error (0:037) (0:070) (0:076)
H0 : E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 1)$ E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:104!!! 0:171!! 0:167!
Standard error (0:031) (0:067) (0:090)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:259!!! 0:320!! 0:394!
Standard error (0:076) (0:126) (0:152)
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Table IA.3: continued
Panel C: Domestic Market Betas or World Market Betas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
!Size 0:046!!! 0:040!!! 0:043!!! 0:055!!! 0:050!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003)
!Book-to-Market !0:009 0:002 !0:001 !0:008 0:005
(0:019) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
!Leverage projection 0:030 !0:031 !0:050 0:060 !0:013
(0:044) (0:041) (0:042) (0:045) (0:042)
!Insidersí share !0:246!!! !0:248!!! !0:454!!!
(0:025) (0:025) (0:065)
!Intangibles !0:247!!! !0:608!!!
(0:053) (0:133)
!Intangibles (with cash) 0:225!!! !0:007
(0:058) (0:132)
!(Insidersí share " Renegotiation 0:361!!!
failure) (0:101)
!(Intangibles " 0:591!!!
Renegotiation failure) (0:201)
!(Intangibles (with cash) " 0:406!!
Renegotiation failure) (0:196)
Constant 0:016!!! 0:018!!! 0:017!!! 0:014!!! 0:016!!!
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
F statistic 4; 106:079 4; 029:733 4; 031:270 3; 301:814 3; 201:306
Observations 372,714 372,714 372,714 372,714 372,714
Average adjusted R2 0:06 0:06 0:06 0:05 0:05
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.3: continued
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic $0:079!! $0:014 0:335!!!
Standard error (0:040) (0:079) (0:083)
H0 : E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 1)$ E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:121!!! 0:228!!! 0:203!!
Standard error (0:034) (0:077) (0:098)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:304!!! 0:426!! 0:341!!
Standard error (0:085) (0:145) (0:165)
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Table IA. 4: Equity Beta, Renegotiation Frictions and Leverage
This table shows the full set of estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic market beta on
proxies of liquidation costs (Intangibles and Intangibles with cash), shareholdersí bargaining power
(Insidersí share), and our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure) (see Table VI in
the paper). Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample consists of monthly
observations from 1993 to 2006. Each Örmís Domestic Market Beta is computed each month from
the regression of the past 60 monthly returns on its countryís contemporaneous market return.
The estimates in Panel A are for the two subsamples of High Leverage (HL) and Low Leverage
(LL) Örms. The HL and the LL subsamples include, respectively, the top and bottom three deciles
of the distribution of Leverage projection. Leverage projection is the orthogonal projection of the
Örmís Leverage in year t > 0 on Renegotiation failure, the Örmís initial Leverage (t = 0), the
countryís statutory corporate tax rate, the Örmís Intangibles, Insidersí share, Size and Book-to-
market, and yearly dummies. Standard errors adjusted for correlation within Örms and time are
reported in parentheses. This panel also reports statistics for the sensitivity of the equity beta to
Renegotiation failure implied by the parameter estimates and evaluated at di§erent values of the
proxies for liquidation costs and shareholderís bargaining power. In Panel B, (HSD) and (LSD)
contain Örms in the top and bottom three deciles of the distribution of Short-term debt projection,
which is deÖned following the same method as for Leverage projection.
Panel A: Estimates conditional on subsamples deÖned by Leverage
(1) (2) (3)
LL HL LL HL LL HL
Size 0:032!!! 0:046!!! 0:042!!! 0:052!!! 0:037!!! 0:043!!!
(0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:007) (0:006)
Book-to-Market 0:043!!! 0:106!!! $0:030 0:073!!! 0:029 0:108!!!
(0:018) (0:018) (0:019) (0:019) (0:018) (0:018)
Leverage projection $0:256! 0:007 0:348!! 0:172! $0:128 0:086
(0:137) (0:087) (0:164) (0:089) (0:139) (0:086)
Renegotiation failure $0:111 $0:042 $0:154 $0:814!!! $0:069 $0:477!!
(0:087) (0:084) (0:158) (0:197) (0:200) (0:191)
Insidersí share $0:485!!! $0:170
(0:107) (0:108)
Insidersí share ' 0:416!! 0:433!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:164) (0:159)
Intangibles $1:015!!! $1:849!!!
(0:231) (0:268)
Intangibles ' 0:692! 1:931!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:366) (0:392)
Intangibles (with cash) 0:097 $0:539!!
(0:213) (0:223)
Intangibles (with cash) ' 0:359 1:025!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:330) (0:341)
Constant 0:810!!! 0:422!!! 0:838!!! 1:163!!! 0:446!!! 0:672!!!
(0:076) (0:087) (0:104) (0:139) (0:131) (0:137)
F statistic 712:658 861:805 810:469 1; 412:098 489:482 809:369
Observations 113,284 112,837 113,284 112,837 113,284 112,837
Average adjusted R2 0:04 0:04 0:04 0:07 0:03 0:04
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.4: continued
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@*
@ Renegotiation failure
jHL $
@*
@ Renegotiation failure
jLL = 0
(1) (2) (3)
LL HL LL HL LL HL
@*
@ Renegotiation failure
evaluated at:
Average Intangibles or
Insidersí share 0:063 0:126!!! 0:131!!! 0:134!!! 0:156!!! 0:111!!!
Standard error (0:044) (0:047) (0:044) (0:045) (0:047) (0:043)
Intangibles or
Insidersí share= 0:5 0:097!! 0:175!!! 0:192!!! 0:151!!! 0:111!!! 0:035
Standard error (0:044) (0:047) (0:054) (0:045) (0:049) (0:048)
Intangibles or
Insidersí share = 1 0:305!!! 0:391!!! 0:539!! 1:117!!! 0:291! 0:548!!!
Standard error (0:099) (0:101) (0:219) (0:205) (0:152) (0:150)
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Table IA.4: continued
Panel B: Estimates conditional on subsamples deÖned by Short-term leverage
(1) (2) (3)
LSD HSD LSD HSD LSD HSD
Size 0:021!!! 0:042!!! 0:026!!! 0:057!!! 0:018!! 0:047!!!
(0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007)
Book-to-Market 0:063!!! 0:014 0:033! $0:018 0:069!!! 0:014
(0:018) (0:019) (0:019) (0:018) (0:018) (0:019)
Short term leverage projection $0:309!!! 0:082 $0:110 0:304!!! $0:315!!! 0:133
(0:079) (0:084) (0:090) (0:085) (0:080) (0:086)
Renegotiation failure 0:085 $0:272!!! $0:450!!! $0:100 $0:084 $0:126
(0:080) (0:095) (0:163) (0:199) (0:184) (0:225)
Insidersí share $0:146 $0:601!!!
(0:110) (0:116)
Insidersí share ' 0:299!! 0:772!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:161) (0:179)
Intangibles $1:255!!! $1:023!!!
(0:210) (0:299)
Intangibles ' 1:297!!! 0:531
Renegotiation failure (0:308) (0:450)
Intangibles (with cash) $0:015 $0:018
(0:200) (0:249)
Intangibles (with cash) ' 0:483! 0:425
Renegotiation failure (0:290) (0:393)
Constant 0:652!!! 0:764!!! 1:125!!! 0:770!!! 0:616!!! 0:432!!!
(0:078) (0:087) (0:119) (0:135) (0:136) (0:148)
F statistic 452:405 848:595 783:303 1; 017:959 504:056 607:852
Observations 104,669 104,255 104,669 104,255 104,669 104,255
Average adjusted R2 0:02 0:05 0:05 0:06 0:03 0:04
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
(Continues)
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Table IA.4: continued
Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@*
@ Renegotiation failure
jHL $
@*
@ Renegotiation failure
jLL = 0
(1) (2) (3)
LSD HSD LSD HSD LSD HSD
@*
@ Renegotiation failure
evaluated at:
Average Intangibles or
Insidersí share 0:201!!! 0:059 0:176!!! 0:129!! 0:212!!! 0:121!!
Standard error (0:045) (0:051) (0:044) (0:051) (0:042) (0:050)
Intangibles or
Insidersí share= 0:5 0:234!!! 0:114!! 0:198!!! 0:166!!! 0:158!!! 0:086
Standard error (0:047) (0:052) (0:043) (0:061) (0:054) (0:054)
Intangibles or
Insidersí share = 1 0:384!!! 0:500!!! 0:847!!! 0:432 0:400!!! 0:299!
Standard error (0:104) (0:111) (0:157) (0:263) (0:118) (0:181)
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Table IA. 5: Robustness Analysis
This table presents the full set of estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic Market Beta
on proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles), and
alternative measures of renegotiation frictions (see Table VII in the paper). Sources and deÖnitions
for all variables are in Table I. The sample period consists of monthly observations from 1993 to
2006. The Örmís Domestic Market Beta is computed for every month from the regression of the
latest 60 historical monthly returns on its countryís contemporaneous market return. Standard
errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses. In Panel
A, our measure of renegotiation frictions is Renegotiation failure. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates
for a subsample of Örms with the proportion of foreign sales or foreign assets below a 5% threshold.
Columns 3 and 4 report the results for a subsample of countries that have never changed their
bankruptcy code between 1993 and 2005. Panel B reports estimates for the full sample of Örms and
countries, but uses the index of priority at which creditors are served in default (Priority), and the
creditorsí recovery rate (Creditorsí recovery) as alternative measures of debt renegotiation frictions.
Panel A: Excluding multinational Örms or years before last bankruptcy code change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock market turnover $0:187!!! $0:165!!! $0:150!!! $0:127!!!
(0:016) (0:016) (0:009) (0:009)
Stock market cap to GDP $0:126!!! $0:130!!! $0:090!!! $0:092!!
(0:023) (0:024) (0:014) (0:014)
Private credit to GDP 0:103!!! 0:098!!! 0:071!!! 0:077!!!
(0:019) (0:019) (0:014) (0:015)
French 0:254!!! 0:188!!! 0:251!!! 0:185!!!
(0:049) (0:048) (0:024) (0:024)
German 0:251!!! 0:211!!! 0:208!!! 0:155!!!
(0:029) (0:030) (0:017) (0:018)
Scandinavian $0:003 $0:023 $0:066!! $0:092!!!
(0:063) (0:061) (0:031) (0:031)
Socialist 0:314! 0:237 0:000 0:000
(0:181) (0:175) (0:001) (0:001)
Size $0:007 0:001 0:019!!! 0:033!!!
(0:007) (0:007) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-Market $0:018 $0:031! $0:010 $0:020!
(0:016) (0:017) (0:011) (0:011)
Leverage projection $0:167!! $0:012 $0:031 0:105!!
(0:067) (0:074) (0:041) (0:045)
Renegotiation failure 0:323!!! $0:209 0:245!!! $0:009
(0:098) (0:209) (0:053) (0:102)
Insidersí share $0:324!! $0:434!!!
(0:136) (0:064)
Intangibles $1:219!!! $0:828!!!
(0:271) (0:139)
Insidersí share ' Renegotiation failure 0:328 0:330!!!
(0:206) (0:096)
Intangibles ' Renegotiation failure 1:474!!! 0:848!!!
(0:414) (0:204)
Constant 0:652!!! 0:996!!! 0:619!!! 0:708!!!
(0:094) (0:149) (0:054) (0:075)
F statistic 2; 243:042 2; 288:909 5; 179:640 4; 752:762
Observations 101,827 101,827 342,672 342,672
Average adjusted R2 0:22 0:22 0:14 0:13
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
Continues)
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Table IA.5: continued
Panel B: Creditorsí priority and recovery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock market turnover $0:189!!! $0:162!!! $0:153!!! $0:133!!!
(0:010) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009)
Stock market cap to GDP $0:071!!! $0:070!!! $0:040!!! $0:035!!
(0:013) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014)
Private credit to GDP 0:044!!! 0:039!!! $0:461!!! $0:420!!!
(0:015) (0:015) (0:052) (0:050)
French 0:051!!! $0:004 0:054!!! 0:022
(0:021) (0:022) (0:020) (0:021)
German 0:144!!! 0:089!!! 0:120!!! 0:077!!!
(0:016) (0:017) (0:015) (0:015)
Scandinavian $0:097!!! $0:128!!! $0:124!!! $0:139!!!
(0:024) (0:025) (0:025) (0:025)
Socialist 0:015 $0:110 $0:096 $0:199
(0:128) (0:126) (0:129) (0:127)
Size 0:019!!! 0:033!!! 0:020!!! 0:030!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-Market $0:008 $0:017 $0:010 $0:019!
(0:011) (0:011) (0:010) (0:011)
Leverage projection $0:038 0:084! $0:030 0:076!
(0:041) (0:045) (0:040) (0:044)
Priority $0:103!!! 0:169!!!
(0:023) (0:042)
Recovery $0:719!!! 0:166
(0:090) (0:115)
Insidersí share $0:920!!! $0:791!!!
(0:132) (0:082)
Intangibles 1:079!!! 0:449!!
(0:351) (0:195)
Insidersí share ' Priority 0:174!!!
(0:035)
Intangibles ' Priority $0:362!!!
(0:091)
Insidersí share ' Creditorsí recovery 0:739!!!
(0:103)
Intangibles ' Creditorsí recovery $0:890!!!
(0:237)
Recovery ' GDP growth 0:520!!! 0:472!!!
(0:060) (0:057)
Constant 1:404!!! 0:277! 1:478!!! 0:711!!!
(0:096) (0:162) (0:079) (0:094)
F statistic 4; 006:603 3; 501:730 4; 513:083 4; 009:880
Observations 351,099 351,099 351,333 351,333
Average adjusted R2 0:12 0:11 0:14 0:13
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table IA. 6: Volatility, Renegotiation Frictions and Institutional Variables
This table shows the full set of estimates of the regression of the Örmís volatility on proxies for
shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles), and our mea-
sure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation Failure) (see Table VIII in the paper). Sources
and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample period consists of all monthly obser-
vations from 1993 to 2006. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is Total return volatility,
deÖned as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past 60-months
window. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is Systematic return volatility, deÖned as
the annualized square root of the di§erence between the variance of monthly stock returns and
the variance of residuals from a regression of monthly returns on the lagged, contemporaneous,
and lead domestic market index returns. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is Idio-
syncratic return volatility, deÖned as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from a
regression of monthly returns on the lagged, contemporaneous, and lead domestic market index
returns. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported
in parentheses.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stock market turnover 0:040!!! 0:045!!! $0:012!!! $0:007!! 0:054!!! 0:057!!!
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Stock market cap to GDP $0:002 $0:003 $0:021!!! $0:022!!! 0:012!!! 0:011!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Private credit to GDP $0:002 $0:002 0:023!!! 0:023!!! $0:021!!! $0:021!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003)
Growth options 0:023!!! 0:024!!! 0:003 0:003 0:025!!! 0:025!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
French $0:016!! $0:027!!! 0:051!!! 0:039!!! $0:052!!! $0:058!!!
(0:008) (0:008) (0:007) (0:007) (0:006) (0:006)
German 0:008 $0:001 0:047!!! 0:039!!! $0:017!!! $0:023!!!
(0:005) (0:005) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Scandinavian $0:024!!! $0:029!!! 0:019!!! 0:016!! $0:041!!! $0:044!!!
(0:008) (0:008) (0:007) (0:007) (0:006) (0:006)
Socialist 0:194!!! 0:175!!! 0:167!!! 0:145!!! 0:107!!! 0:098!!!
(0:033) (0:032) (0:047) (0:046) (0:017) (0:017)
Size $0:014!!! $0:011!!! 0:003!!! 0:005!!! $0:018!!! $0:017!!!
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Book-to-market $0:014!!! $0:018!!! $0:001 $0:004 $0:015!!! $0:018!!!
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003)
Leverage projection 0:040!!! 0:076!!! 0:006 0:035!!! 0:036!!! 0:060!!!
(0:012) (0:012) (0:009) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
Renegotiation failure $0:073!!! $0:069!!! $0:012 $0:031 $0:078!!! $0:069!!!
(0:013) (0:026) (0:012) (0:022) (0:011) (0:021)
Insidersí share $0:080!!! $0:106!!! $0:030!!
(0:017) (0:014) (0:013)
Insidersí share ' 0:105!!! 0:145!!! 0:031
Renegotiation failure (0:024) (0:02) (0:02)
Intangibles $0:149!!! $0:176!!! $0:073!!!
(0:033) (0:029) (0:027)
Intangibles ' Renegotiation failure 0:076 0:159!!! 0:005
(0:049) (0:042) (0:04)
Constant 0:378!!! 0:393!!! 0:135!!! 0:152!!! 0:362!!! 0:370!!!
(0:02) (0:023) (0:019) (0:022) (0:015) (0:018)
F statistic 1; 968:48 2; 032:53 3; 478:95 3; 361:64 4; 867:89 4; 981:82
Observations 351,082 351,082 351,082 351,082 351,082 351,082
Average adjusted R2 0:08 0:09 0:11 0:11 0:17 0:18
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively. 26
Table IA. 7: Robustness to Dropping Firms Based on their Foreign Activity
This table presents the estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic Market Beta
on proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (In-
tangibles), and our measure of renegotiation frictions. Sources and deÖnitions for all
variables are in Table I. The sample period consists of monthly observations from 1993
to 2006. The Örmís Domestic Market Beta is computed for every month from the re-
gression of the latest 60 historical monthly returns on its countryís contemporaneous
market return. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and
are reported in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2 of Panel A we report estimates for a
subsample of Örms with the proportion of foreign sales to total sales below the sample
average; and in columns 3 and 4 we keep Örms with foreign sales below the median.
Panel B reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the estimates in Panel A,
expressed in terms of average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock market turnover $0:178!!! $0:156!!! $0:191!!! $0:170!!!
(0:014) (0:014) (0:016) (0:017)
Stock market cap to GDP $0:104!!! $0:104!!! $0:101!!! $0:101!!!
(0:017) (0:018) (0:024) (0:025)
Private credit to GDP 0:085!!! 0:090!!! 0:092!!! 0:088!!!
(0:017) (0:018) (0:018) (0:019)
French 0:282!!! 0:221!!! 0:269!!! 0:215!!!
(0:036) (0:035) (0:048) (0:048)
German 0:230!!! 0:196!!! 0:252!!! 0:215!!!
(0:024) (0:024) (0:029) (0:029)
Scandinavian 0:021 0:008 $0:017 $0:036
(0:036) (0:035) (0:054) (0:053)
Socialist 0:294! 0:203 0:288 0:220
(0:161) (0:159) (0:178) (0:173)
Size 0:013!! 0:022!!! $0:003 0:005
(0:005) (0:005) (0:007) (0:006)
Book-to-market $0:008 $0:019 $0:014 $0:025
(0:014) (0:014) (0:016) (0:016)
Leverage projection $0:144!! $0:011 $0:018!!! 0:035
(0:057) (0:062) (0:066) (0:073)
Renegotiation failure 0:216!!! $0:010 0:344!!! $0:302
(0:080) (0:156) (0:092) (0:192)
Insidersí share $0:476!!! $0:281!!
(0:096) (0:131)
Insidersí share ' 0:529!!! 0:246
Renegotiation failure (0:147) (0:194)
Intangibles $0:879!!! $1:298!!!
(0:203) (0:251)
Intangibles ' Renegotiation failure 0:982!!! 1:635!!!
(0:310) (0:379)
Constant 0:634!!! 0:738!!! 0:622!!! 1:025!!!
(0:076) (0:111) (0:091) (0:139)
F statistic 2; 380:41 2; 275:27 2; 069:38 2; 119:59
Observations 142,151 142,151 103,120 103,120
Average adjusted R2 0:17 0:17 0:20 0:21
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table IA.7: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share
= 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test statistic 0:040 0:078 $0:022 0:209!!
Standard error (0:051) (0:104) (0:051) (0:100)
H0 : E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 1)$ E (ri $ rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:335!!! 0:325!!! 0:279!!! 0:265!!!
Standard error (0:041) (0:040) (0:041) (0:039)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:562!!! 0:626!!! 0:367!!! 0:683!!!
Standard error (0:079) (0:098) (0:088) (0:096)
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Table IA. 8: Robustness to Dropping US and Japanese Firms
This table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic
market beta on proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liq-
uidation costs (Intangibles), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation
failure), and Örm-speciÖc controls. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in
Table I. The sample consists of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. In columns
1 and 2 of Panel A we exclude US Örms; and in columns 3 and 4 we exclude Japanese
Örms. In columns 1 and 2 of Panel B we exclude both US and Japanese Örms; in
columns 3 and 4 we use a random sample of 1000 US and Japanese Örms each.
Each Örmís Domestic market beta is computed each month from the regression
of the past 60 monthly returns on the domestic marketís contemporaneous return.
Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time, and are reported
in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 0:048!!! 0:063!!! 0:036!!! 0:043!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-Market 0:011 #0:001 0:044!!! 0:027!!
(0:011) (0:012) (0:013) (0:013)
Leverage projection 0:085!! 0:238!!! #0:323!!! #0:197!!!
(0:041) (0:047) (0:060) (0:066)
Renegotiation failure #0:266!!! #0:143 0:113!! #0:189!!
(0:047) (0:092) (0:051) (0:095)
Insidersí share #0:676!!! #0:095
(0:059) (0:066)
Intangibles #0:725!!! #0:673!!!
(0:132) (0:139)
Insidersí share & Renegotiation 0:667!!! 0:022
failure (0:087) (0:095)
Intangibles & 0:574!!! 0:733!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:190) (0:201)
Constant 0:789!!! 0:629!!! 0:521!!! 0:712!!!
(0:046) (0:065)) (0:050) (0:068)
F statistic 5; 061:31 3; 771:84 1; 885:36 1; 965:15
Observations 301,374 301,374 243,817 243,817
Average adjusted R2 0:09 0:07 0:04 0:05
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table IA.8: continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 0:067!!! 0:075!!! 0:044!!! 0:054!!!
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Book-to-Market 0:001 0:003 0:048!!! 0:021!
(0:012) (0:013) (0:011) (0:012)
Leverage projection 0:014 0:011 #0:145!!! 0:043
(0:058) (0:068) (0:050) (0:055)
Renegotiation failure #0:083! 0:043 #0:015 #0:221!!
(0:046) (0:085) (0:048) (0:096)
Insidersí share #0:459!!! #0:271!!!
(0:059) (0:065)
Intangibles #0:080 #0:925!!!
(0:133) (0:139)
Insidersí share & Renegotiation 0:337!!! 0:278!!!
failure (0:087) (0:092)
Intangibles & 0:212 0:792!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:179) (0:201)
Constant 0:503!!! 0:240!!! 0:577!!! 0:757!!!
(0:051) (0:065)) (0:048) (0:068)
F statistic 5; 107:61 3; 988:00 2; 156:62 2; 683:70
Observations 168,307 168,307 280,146 280,146
Average adjusted R2 0:09 0:07 0:15 0:13
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table IA. 9: Robustness to Scholes-Williams Betas
Panel A of this table shows the pooled OLS estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic market
beta on proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles
and Intangibles (with cash)), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure), and
Örm-speciÖc controls. In this table we compute the Domestic market beta using the Scholes and
Williams (1977) methodology to take into account asynchronous trading, using 60 monthly return
observations. Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The sample consists of monthly
observations from 1993 to 2006. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within Örms and time,
and are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports statistics for the economic signiÖcance of the
estimates in panel A, expressed in terms of average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock market turnover $0:184!!! $0:195!!! $0:192!!! $0:173!!! $0:184!!!
(0:012) (0:012) (0:012) (0:012) (0:012)
Stock market cap to GDP $0:125!!! $0:123!!! $0:124!!! $0:123!!! $0:124!!!
(0:018) (0:018) (0:018) (0:018) (0:018)
Private credit to GDP 0:236!!! 0:237!!! 0:238!!! 0:241!!! 0:243!!!
(0:017) (0:017) (0:017) (0:017) (0:017)
French 0:447!!! 0:459!!! 0:459!!! 0:419!!! 0:431!!!
(0:034) (0:034) (0:035) (0:034) (0:034)
German 0:191!!! 0:203!!! 0:204!!! 0:164!!! 0:177!!!
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
Scandinavian 0:009!!! 0:010!!! 0:099!!! 0:082!!! 0:094!!!
(0:033) (0:032) (0:033) (0:033) (0:032)
Socialist 0:539!!! 0:553!!! 0:555!!! 0:487!!! 0:490!!!
(0:150) (0:152) (0:151) (0:150) (0:152)
Size $0:006 $0:011!! $0:009! 0:002 $0:003
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004)
Book-to-Market $0:054!!! $0:045!!! $0:047!!! $0:053!!! $0:041!!!
(0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014)
Leverage projection 0:026 $0:026 $0:038 0:055 $0:016
(0:051) (0:048) (0:048) (0:052) (0:048)
Renegotiation failure 0:558!!! 0:565!!! 0:534!!! $0:004 0:007
(0:051) (0:051) (0:074) (0:149) (0:178)
Insidersí share $0:182!!! $0:188!!! $0:228!!!
(0:030) (0:030) (0:085)
Intangibles $0:222!!! $0:986!!!
(0:065) (0:191)
Intangibles (with cash) 0:188!!! $0:415!!
(0:133) (0:186)
Insidersí share ' Renegotiation 0:072
failure (0:133)
Intangibles ' 1:245!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:296)
Intangibles (with cash) ' 1:005!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:297)
Constant 0:729!!! 0:555!!! 0:668!!! 0:927!!! 0:734!!!
(0:079) (0:083) (0:084) (0:111) (0:129)
F statistic 3; 088:37 3; 082:04 3; 050:41 2; 988:64 2; 928:28
Observations 343,190 343,190 343,190 343,190 343,190
Average adjusted R2 0:09 0:09 0:09 0:09 0:09
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table IA.9: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic #0:127!! 0:212! 0:482!!!
Standard error (0:050) (0:109) (0:115)
H0 : E (ri # rjRenegotiation failure = 1)# E (ri # rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:460!!! 0:461!!! 0:489!!!
Standard error (0:042) (0:042) (0:042)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:495!!! 0:867!!! 0:826!!!
Standard error (0:077) (0:101) (0:111)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table IA. 10: Robustness to Fama and MacBeth Estimator
This table shows the Fama and MacBeth estimates of the regression of the Domestic
Market Beta on proxies for shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liq-
uidation costs (Intangibles, and Intangibles (with cash)), and our measure of rene-
gotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure). Sources and deÖnitions for all variables
are in Table ??. The sample period consists of monthly observations from 1993 to
2006. Each Örmís Domestic Market Beta is computed for every month from the
regression of the latest 60 historical monthly returns on its contemporaneous do-
mestic market return. Standard errors adjusted for serial correlation (Newey-West)
are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0:041!!! 0:034!!! 0:036!!! 0:044!!! 0:037!!!
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Book-to-Market 0:027!!! 0:062!!! 0:059!!! 0:024!!! 0:060!!!
(0:009) (0:008) (0:008) (0:009) (0:008)
Leverage projection 0:151!!!#0:039! #0:056!! 0:162!!!#0:035
(0:029) (0:022) (0:022) (0:028) (0:022)
Renegotiation failure 0:113!!! 0:106!!!#0:014 #0:271!!!#0:145!!!
(0:009) (0:008) (0:019) (0:025) (0:025)
Insidersí share #0:070!!!#0:059!!!#0:227!!!
(0:012) (0:013) (0:027)
Intangibles #0:609!!! #1:115!!!
(0:028) (0:04)
Intangibles (with cash) 0:192!!! #0:070!!!
(0:016) (0:02)
Insidersí share & Renegotiation 0:295!!!
failure (0:032)
Intangibles & 0:870!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:051)
Intangibles (with cash) & 0:456!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:05)
Constant 0:718!!! 0:420!!! 0:601!!! 0:897!!! 0:526!!!
(0:014) (0:018) (0:022) (0:016) (0:012)
Observations 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884
Number of months 139 139 139 139 139
Average adjusted R2 0:07 0:05 0:05 0:07 0:04
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signiÖcance levels, respectively.
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Table IA. 11: Robustness to Matching Firms by Generalized Propensity Score
Panel A of this table shows the estimates of the regression of the Örmís Domestic market beta
on proxies of shareholdersí bargaining power (Insidersí share), liquidation costs (Intangibles and
Intangibles (with cash)), our measure of renegotiation frictions (Renegotiation failure), and estimated
generalized propensity scores (GPS). Sources and deÖnitions for all variables are in Table I. The
sample consists of monthly observations from 1993 to 2006. Firms are matched by Size, Book-
to-Market, and Leverage projection using the propensity score approach proposed by Hirano and
Imbens (2004), which generalizes the matching procedure to the case of a continuous treatment.
This parametric approach consists of two steps. In the Örst step, we estimate the parameters of the
conditional distribution of Renegotiation failure given Size, Book-to-Market, and Leverage projection
by maximum likelihood. The generalized propensity score is the predicted conditional density of
Renegotiation failure given the covariates. In the second step, we include the estimated GPS as
a control variable in our baseline regression, and estimate the parameters with OLS. Each Örmís
domestic market beta is computed each month from the regression of the past 60 monthly returns
on the domestic marketís contemporaneous return. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation
within Örms and time, and are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports statistics for the economic
signiÖcance of the estimates in panel A, expressed in terms of average monthly excess returns.
Panel A: Pooled OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimated GPS 0:030!!! 0:031!!! 0:025!!! 0:038!!! 0:035!!!
(0:009) (0:009) (0:010) (0:009) (0:009)
Renegotiation failure 0:098!!! 0:106!!!#0:011 #0:325!!! #0:148
(0:027) (0:026) (0:049) (0:101) (0:114)
Insidersí share #0:149!!! #0:110!!!#0:268!!!
(0:027) (0:028) (0:071)
Intangibles #0:466!!! #1:019!!!
(0:049) (0:145)
Intangibles (with cash) 0:258!!! #0:012
(0:051) (0:131)
Insidersí share & Renegotiation 0:260!!!
failure (0:106)
Intangibles & 1:013!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:222)
Intangibles (with cash) & 0:498!!!
Renegotiation failure (0:203)
Constant 0:941!!! 0:553!!! 0:788!!! 1:099!!! 0:639!!!
(0:036) (0:041) (0:048) (0:069) (0:079)
F statistic 2; 251:988 1; 251:646 988:949 1; 828:295 1; 059:504
Observations 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884 376,884
Average adjusted R2 0:03 0:01 0:01 0:02 0:01
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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Table IA.11: continued
Panel B: Further Tests of the Modelís Implications
H0 :
@E(ri"rjRenegotiation failure=1)
@ Intangibles or Insidersí share = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic #0:007 #0:0:05 0:409!!!
Standard error (0:041) (0:083) (0:082)
H0 : E (ri # rjRenegotiation failure = 1)# E (ri # rjRenegotiation failure = 0) = 0
(3) (4) (5)
Test statistic evaluated at average
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:078!!! 0:116!!! 0:124!!!
Standard error (0:024) (0:025) (0:023)
Test statistic evaluated at maximum
Intangibles or Insidersí share 0:210!!! 0:457!!! 0:94!!!
Standard error (0:054) (0:078) (0:076)
a Estimates followed by !!!, !! and ! are statistically di§erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signiÖcance levels,
respectively.
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